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Abstract
Limiting DNS covert channels and Network Validated DNS
Rex McCracken
Despite the variety and number of network security devices and policies available,
sensitive data, such as intellectual property and business data, can still be surreptiously
sent via the Internet to unscrupulous receivers. Furthermore, few security mechanisms
address securing or limiting covert channels. This study defines a framework for
determining a rule set to minimize covert channel capacity on the DNS protocol
specifically. The information and techniques used in this study may be useful in aiding
security professionals and developers with enforcing security policies on DNS and other
Internet protocols.
This research resulted in the development of a rudimentary tool, referred to as
NV-DNS, capable of detecting and effectively limiting the capability of covert channels
in DNS communication packets.
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Chapter 1
1
Introduction
Running a business in the 21st century is different from any other time in history.
Years ago, merchants and vendors could assure themselves a piece of the market share by
simply carrying a wanted product that no other vendor carried. Few businesses anymore
have the fortune to be the only vendor marketing a unique product to the public as
imitators and competing products are introduced to the masses through various
advertising venues, hauled to a local shopping mall, or shipped directly to the consumer’s
home. Regardless of a business’ financial classification or products, competing vendors,
manufacturers, and even charities would all love to have something from their
competition that is more valuable than a single product: intellectual property. [1]
Intellectual property is a major portion of the foundation on which every business
grows and develops. Every business has some form of intellectual property, be it
customer information lists, purchasing prices, diagrams for a new piece of equipment
under development, or a new manufacturing process. Intellectual property therefore
becomes the advantage that a particular business has over its competitors in order to
continue to exist in the business place. Thus the largest threat to a company’s competitive
edge and existence is the loss or leakage of their intellectual property to a competitor.
Internet access is available in nearly every business location and is used in daily
operations of a business. While beneficial to the operation and expansion of a company,
the speed and stability of the communications afforded by internet access also allows a
malicious employee to send a company’s intellectual property with relative ease to
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someone external to the company without dealing with some type of physical security
mechanism. [2]
E-mail, FTP, HTTP, and instant messaging programs are the easiest and most
common methods of transferring large amounts of data across the Internet. E-mail
accounts are typically given all company employees for company use and nearly every email program available has the ability to send file attachments of any size, hampered only
by the recipient’s e-mail file size. FTP communications provide a direct means of
efficiently transferring files of any size from client to server or vice versa and does not
suffer from the size limitations e-mail is potentially subject to, but requires a valid IP
address or domain name in order to successfully initiate communications.
HTTP communications allow for the same possibilities as FTP and E-mail and is
commonly known as “web surfing.” The newest communication class proliferating on
network channels is instant messaging programs such as AOL Instant Messenger, MSN
Messenger, and Yahoo Messenger, just to name a few. The basic function of these
programs is to send and receive text messages from one username to another. Early
versions of the messaging programs lacked file transfer and encryption capabilities, but
recent revisions of the software have incorporated these features as well as video and
audio capabilities. Spin-offs and clones of these software programs have similar
capabilities.
E-mail, FTP, and HTTP traffic are the most commonly used methods of
transferring data and are also the most commonly logged actions on a company network.
User’s e-mails are typically stored on the main e-mail server and archived for later
retrieval or restoration. Employees sending out attachments of private company data

2

through e-mail can quickly be traced through a combination of username and Internet
Protocol (IP) address tracing. Unauthorized FTP connections and traffic pushing data out
of the company network can easily be traced through the router logs or denied in the
router settings, thus limiting the effectiveness of FTP as a means of transferring files.
HTTP connection pushing out large amounts of data from non-server computers raise
their own questions, and are subject to the same requirements that FTP traffic falls under.
Instant messaging programs are slightly more difficult to block or protect against, but
most programs send messages and files without encryption over the network and can be
reconstructed using packet sniffing software.
Routers and firewalls are typically the main defensive lines any network
administrator utilizes to help minimize an intruder’s foray into the business’ LAN. Basic
firewalls and routers can easily be set to forward, allow, or deny access to any
combination of thousands of ports and many guides, websites, and other articles are
available to help customize these settings based on the business’ network topography.
Advanced networking equipment and software can further enhance and extend the basic
permit and deny rules using technologies like Stateful Packet Inspection, bandwidth
throttling, and intrusion detection systems at an often significant financial investment for
more capable hardware and software. Despite the range of technologies available to
combat external intruders and malicious internal users, there is a basic and integral
service of the Internet that is typically unmonitored by businesses and security
professionals alike.
DNS, or domain name service, is an integral part of the workings of the internet.
Every time a user attempts to connect to a site, be it google.com, wvu.edu, or any other of
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a number of sites, a query is sent upwards through a hierarchy of computers and routers
to try and find the IP address to which a specific domain name is mapped. Without DNS,
users would be forced to remember a series of numbers for each site they wanted to visit.
Attempts to remember Google (64.233.167.99), WVU (157.182.140.235), and ZDNet
(216.239.115.140) would quickly devolve into random number guessing and make
Internet connectivity little more than a passing interest, especially should the IP address
of the domain change.
As a necessary service for the Internet to work, the DNS protocol specification, as
approved by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), uses an iterative hierarchical
model to process domain name to IP address queries. DNS takes a domain name as an
alphanumeric string and iteratively queries DNS name servers, returning a valid IP
address of the form x.x.x.x, where x is a number from 0 to 255 when the DNS server
returns a positive response. The protocol’s specification answered a large number of
questions concerning the handling of future growth of the Internet, but designers knew
they could not foresee all the potential possibilities of DNS. With this in mind, designers
chose to leave room for future revisions and additions to the protocol in the form of
undefined or reserved bits, bytes, ranges, and experimental options. [3]
The protocol’s specification calls for these unused bits and bytes to all be set to
zero, but failure to properly set these bits will not result in failed responses as systems
receiving DNS queries and responses ignore the undefined portions of the DNS packet.
The unspecified bits coupled with an un-enforced request allows for data-stuffed packets
to be created and sent on without disturbing the packet’s validity as seen by the routers
and DNS servers. A crafty employee could utilize these gaps in the protocol to send out

4

seemingly innocent DNS requests while simultaneously sending off bits and pieces of
company data. The practice of hiding a communication within a medium is known as
creating a covert channel.
The focus of this research is on the detection and logging of covert channels in
DNS to aid security professionals and software development personnel faced with the
daunting task of controlling unauthorized communications through design and
application. This research is also being done in response to an article reported on August
2nd 2004 concerning the ability of DNS to contain covert channels and the lack of
monitoring of this particular protocol. [4]

1.1

Definitions of Steganography and Covert Channels

1.1.1 Steganography
Steganography is the art of inconspicuously hiding data within data, literally
meaning “covered writing”. [5] The overall goal of steganography is to hide the message
within the data well enough such that unintended recipients do not suspect a hidden
message exists. [6] A simple text message using steganography to hide a message may be
as follows:
Prepare and shutdown system workstations or remote
datalinks : Storms will offline realtime data feeds.
Interrupted several hours.
The body of the text hides the message “password : swordfish” using the first
character of the initial word and the first character following a space. The steganography
method is simple and for the most part, so is its detection. [6] notes that an important part
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of steganography’s success is the naïve attitude of human beings by not accepting the
possibility that there is more than meets the eye occurring. Several other simple textbased steganography techniques include word spacing and invisible characters. Images,
audio clips, and movies employ steganographic techniques such as least significant bit
(LSB) alterations, color palette modifications, and manipulation of the compression
algorithms. [5]
[5] states that “information hiding within electronic media requires alterations”
that introduces degradation or unusual characteristics. These anomalies in the media can
be viewed as signatures broadcasting a hidden message’s existence within a
communication; a point directly countering the goal of steganography. Steganalysis can
be defined as “attacks and analysis on hidden information” and is the counter to
steganography. The goal of steganalysis is to examine an image, message, or other
medium that could potentially contain a hidden message, determine if a message exists,
extract the message if possible, or disable or remove the hidden data. To determine if a
hidden message exists, steganalysis relies heavily on statistical analysis of the medium’s
properties to determine if any anomalies exist and if these anomalies are naturally
occurring or the result of tampering. [5]
Steganography is similar in nature to cryptography in several ways, but the two
methods are exclusive. Both methods are concerned with passing a message from party
A to party B without party C being able to understand the message, but the means by
which the messages are passed is where the difference lies. Steganography’s means of
communication relies on stealth and naivety for all non-intended recipients to ensure the
security of a private message. Cryptography’s means of communication relies on the
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strength of the encryption algorithm and key management to secure the message and
makes no attempt to hide the existence of the communication.
Beyond that main difference, steganography and cryptography follow an
algorithm and “key” to encode and later decode the data. For cryptographic messages,
the key is the password, while steganography’s key is the location of the hidden data.
Cryptographic techniques are beyond the scope of this document and will not be
discussed.

1.1.2 Covert Channels
Covert channels are the application of steganographic techniques to
communications mediums. Digital communications protocols used on the Internet are
filled with unused and reserved bit, bytes, open-ended options, and devoid of any type of
validation mechanism to verify the correctness of these communications. Thus, a
steganographer can piggyback their communications onto a valid communications
protocol piece by piece and slowly cart off bits and pieces of data without much worry of
being detected at all. The ease with which a steganographer can piggyback their message
onto an existing protocol depends primarily upon the protocol’s syntax and usage. This
document discusses the DNS protocol and some network topology, making general
references to the protocols upon which DNS traffic operates, TCP and UDP.
The Domain Name Service, or DNS, is an Internet Protocol (IP) utilizing the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and/or User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for sending
and receiving domain name translation requests. TCP is a “connection-oriented”
protocol, designed to ensure the delivery and ordering of transmitted packets from sender
to receiver. [7] UDP is a “connectionless” protocol that predates TCP and does not
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ensure the delivery of packets or ordered reception of received packets. [8] UDP is the
protocol primarily used to transmit DNS messages as UDP does not require the overhead
setup that TCP uses to setup the reliable connection. TCP is used in zone and domain
transfers where a large amount of data is passing from server to server and the data must
be carefully preserved. [3], [9]

1.2

Statement of Problem
The goal of this research is to show the weaknesses in the DNS protocol and

provide a methodology for protecting this and future communications protocols from
subversion for use with unauthorized communications.

1.3

Organization

The remainder of this thesis will be organized as follows:
•

Chapter 2 will be a literature review that will form the background for this
research. The concepts of steganalysis, protocol validation, and real-time network
analysis will be discussed regarding current research in the fields.

•

Chapter 3 will discuss the application of steganalysis and protocol validation to
the Domain Name Service and other per-packet protocols on a network.

•

Chapter 4 will provide a description of the architecture of NV-DNS and its usage
on a network segment.

•

Chapter 5 will discuss the results of NV-DNS as applied to several example
problems.
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•

Chapter 6 will be a final discussion and conclusion of this particular work and
will include suggestions and extensions for the future to be even more flexible
and usable in the real world.
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Chapter 2
2
Literature Review
This chapter provides a review of previous research in the fields of
steganographic detection, protocol validation, and real-time network analysis, which form
the foundation for the work conducted in this thesis. This chapter’s goal is to provide the
reader with a basic understanding and background of each area by discussing several
concepts related to each field.

2.1

Steganography
This section will provide a brief description of the current research in the area of

steganography and its detection.

2.1.1 Steganography Overview
Individuals have long been concerned with keeping messages and other
communications from prying eyes. This desire to secure communications fueled two
different means of achieving the same end. One method commonly used to secure digital
communications and data is encryption. With encryption, a private message is scrambled
using some type of algorithm with a sequence of bits known as a key that serves to
configure the algorithm. This methodology of securing a message hopes to guarantee
privacy by the strength of the encryption algorithm and key complexity.
Steganography pursues a different means to achieve the goal of private
communications. Message security in a steganographic model is achieved by hiding the
existence of the message in the first place. [6] defines steganography as “the art of
inconspicuously hiding data within data” such that unintended recipients do not suspect
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the existence of hidden data. The exact process of hiding the information varies from
medium to medium and type to type, but the basic steganographic process requires three
items: cover medium, hidden message, and embedding algorithm. An optional fourth
item required is a key.
The cover medium in the digital realm is some type of object, be it an image,
audio, video, text file, data packet, or other file or grouped item or element. A hidden
message can be text, a file, or any other data type, including single bits. The embedding
algorithm is typically a cover medium-specific algorithm designed to take advantages of
redundancies and unused bits and bytes specialized to that particular piece of data. The
optional key can be used to encrypt the data, configure the embedding algorithm, or both.
The exact process of hiding the information varies from medium to medium, but
the basic design starts with an analysis of the cover medium. The process finds the bits
unnecessary to maintain the medium’s integrity, named the redundant bits, and then the
embedding process replaces the redundant bits with bits from the hidden message. [10]
Based on the cover medium, this embedding process varies in its usage, analysis, and
replacement.
The cover medium is also known as the carrier type, as it is the item which
“carries” the steganographic message. The carrier type can literally be anything physical
(wax on wood tablets) or intangible (bits of data in data communications). History tells
of early steganography attempts by prisoners that hid messages on the wood of the waxcovered tablets they were given. Another account tells of how a Roman general shaved a
slave’s head, tattooed a message, and then sent him to deliver the message after the
slave’s hair had grown back. Suggested recent physical uses of steganography were
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used in the quilts hanging outside the homes of those aiding slaves in the Underground
Railroad, giving them directions and instructions in plain view while keeping their
existence hidden from those unaware of the messages. [11]
Steganography has taken on a new dimension with the explosion of computing
technology and the plethora of digital carrier types the computing growth has created.
Digital cover mediums span a variety of categories and are continually expanding.
Common carries of steganographic messages include the following types listed below.
•

Images – Gifs, JPEGs, and other image file formats typically have some type of
redundancy. Manipulation of these images relies on minute shifts that do not
drastically alter the image.

•

Audio – While images are effective for steganography, the human ear can be less
discernable, especially when trying to listen to quiet background noises under a
loud foreground sound.

•

Video – The sheer size of video files as well as the encoding methods used
permits a much larger amount of data to be stored.

•

Text – Fonts, spacing, and even word and line ordering can hide a message.

•

Network Communications – Many network protocols have unused bits and bytes
reserved for future use and rely on honest implementation and “best practices”

The focus of this research is on network communications, but it is important to be aware
of the other applications of steganography in a digital medium.
Regardless of the medium used, some type of encoding schema must be used to
integrate the hidden data and the cover medium. There are a variety of encoding schemes
available and discussed in the academic community, some of which are applicable to
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multiple carriers, many of which are limited to a specific carrier type. Common
steganographic encoding methods for images, audio, and video include Least Significant
Bit (LSB) and wavelets.
The simplest of these methods is Least Significant Bit substitution where the loworder bit in all or some bytes is replaced by bits from the hidden or secret message. Since
the human eyes and ears are only so discerning and sensitive, the least significant bits of
the object can typically be modified without worry of a person being able to detect it
visually or audibly. However, a computer program can look directly at these bits and
reconstruct them to form a message or file quickly and easily.
The most complex and potentially rewarding method of steganography lies in a
mathematical modeling concept known as a wavelet. Wavelets are functions satisfying
specific mathematical requirements and are used in the representation of functions as well
as other data. [12] discusses the foundations of wavelets and their ability to see “the
forest and the trees.” He also mentions the ability to choose a wavelet best suited for a
particular data set or truncating the coefficients below a specific threshold to achieve data
compression. Research by [13] shows that wavelet manipulation can compress an object
to a maximum compression without threatening a single bit of the hidden message. This
capability of wavelets is an important characteristic which will be discussed shortly.
Data masking and filtering techniques are not discussed here as these techniques
extend data over a cover medium. These are commonly used as a form of digital
watermarking and do hide information, but technically are not considered forms of
steganography. They will not be discussed further in this document.
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Medium- and format-specific steganographic algorithms are the most common
techniques available used to encode data. GIF image files commonly have their color
palette modified or reordered to hold hidden data. JPEG images can have hidden
messages intertwined in the data coefficients describing the image pixels. MP3s and
WAV files are susceptible to hidden messages being encoded quietly during loud
portions of a musical crescendo or other loud noise. Text documents can hide
steganographic data through line spacing, character fonts, text positioning, and even letter
arrangements. Data packets and protocols with loosely defined or undefined bits and
bytes can transmit information untouched by routers or end systems relaying the
information. The list of steganographic mediums and algorithms continues on and on,
including things such as redundant instruction sets in program executables and even file
system tables and definitions.
Regardless of the medium chosen, steganographic techniques can usually be
applied to the medium to encode a message within. While steganography itself is a
powerful means of securing a message, it can be strengthened. Encryption algorithms
can be used in conjunction with steganography methods to further scramble and more
effectively hide the embedded message. Prior to the embedding the hidden data in the
cover medium, the encryption algorithm of choice is run on the hidden message to
encrypt its contents. Once encryption is complete, the scrambled message is embedded
in the cover medium using the algorithm for the specific medium. Some encryption
algorithms used include DES, 3DES, and AES.
The innocuous nature of steganography is also its main weakness. Embedded
data in a cover medium is extremely fragile and is usually threatened or even destroyed

14

by any modifications to the cover medium. Text documents and GIF images are often
irreparably altered simply by viewing the file and then saving it without making even a
single edit. [5] Though there are some encoding methods which provide reliable
robustness against destruction of the hidden message, many techniques are highly
susceptible to attacks on message integrity. Despite this weakness, these mediums and
others are still used to try and pass hidden messages.

2.1.2 Network Covert Channels
Covert channels encompass all types of communications, such as inter-process,
input and output, and even hardware communications. Network covert channels are a
specific focus area in steganography and covert channels using communications protocols
as the medium for sending covert messages.

Network and Internet communications are

not the only types of covert channels available, though many of the same theories apply.
For the purpose of this research, network covert channels will be the main type of covert
channels discussed.
[14] defines network covert channels as exploits “by the manipulation of
communications resources or transmission characteristics” of a communication protocol.
Manipulation of the communications resources includes modification of any of the fields
or values defined in the protocol specification to something other than the expected
usage. Transmission characteristics include miniscule items such as timing between
packet transmissions and the size of the packets being transmitted.
Most of the research found concerning covert channels was concerned with
detecting and disrupting the timing of communications as a means to combat time-based
communications. [14], [15], and [16] all discuss timing as the methodology of choice to
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secretly transmit data. [17] briefly mentions a second means of secretly encoding data by
placing it in network headers, one of the early examples of network covert channels.
The paper continues with a breakdown of covert channel research into four
disciplines: Explanation, Identification, Measurement, and Mitigation. [14] also
provides some methods of measuring a channel’s capacity and provides a concept useful
in combating not only timing channels, but a time-independent item as well: the
introduction of noise into a channel.

2.1.3 Steganalysis
Directly countering the art and science of steganography is steganalysis. The goal
of steganalysis is to detect, extract, or disable steganography in any type of medium.
Regardless of how good the steganography method is, [10] says all steganographic
methods are invasive and therefore leave evidence of their actions. The most difficult
portion of steganalysis is reliably and accurately detecting an embedded message. There
are two different theories driving steganalysis detection: statistical review and
information theory.
Based on the medium, there are a number of characteristics that can be gleaned
from analysis of said medium to create a statistical template. Some characteristics used
in image analysis include luminance, coefficient values, and even image continuity.
These characteristics are then compared to values and tolerances previously generated,
and any values or characteristics exceeding the threshold are flagged and dealt with
accordingly. [10] Depending on the threshold and characteristic values chosen, the
number of erroneous responses (false negatives and false positives) may lead analysts on
a wild goose chase or may keep them from analyzing objects containing hidden data.
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Information theory was pioneered by a researcher named Shannon beginning in
the 1940s. This area of research relates to message sources, communication channels,
and theorems relating entropy to channel capacity. The fundamental concept of
information theory is that information is regarded as only those symbols uncertain to the
receiver in his body of knowledge. A message is analyzed using information theory, the
redundancies and predictabilities are removed, and the resulting message is sent,
minimizing the message’s size while maximizing the number of simultaneous messages
that can be transmitted. [18]
For example, the message “We have a large database to transmit containing secret
agent records” could be minimized to “We hve lrg db 2 trnsmt cntaing scrt agt recs.”
While a simplistic example, it helps illustrate the broader uses of information theory
when transmitting real-time video for streaming internet or cable or satellite TV, or realtime audio over cellular phones and landlines. Transmitting a studio-quality full-motion
video TV signal to a home requires 70,000,000 bits per second, a rate which is
economically impractical even using high bandwidth fiber optics connection. Using
information theory, this rate can be compressed to 368, 192, or even 56 kilobytes per
second. The same idea follows for phones, where voice data is compressed down as low
as 64 kilobits per second, if not lower. [18]
Information theory plays a role in steganalysis because of its reducing and
compressing nature. Using information theory, analysts can determine the object’s
capacity to store extra data or determine whether or not the object has redundancies that
should have been removed during the original encoding process. By examining the
results from each of these processes, analysts can more accurately predict the probability
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that the object has information embedded in it. Information theory can be applied to all
carrier types and cover mediums with algorithms specific to the type and medium
structure or format. For communications protocols, information theory can be used to
determine the protocol’s capacity to hold hidden data and whether or not the protocol is
being used to send extra data. [19]

2.2

Real-time Network Analysis
This section will review research regarding real-time network analysis and

supporting areas.

2.2.1 Real-time Network Analysis
Humans have long had questions about the truth of what is really happening
during an event. We may think that we know what is happening, but we still want proof
that what we think is occurring is truly occurring. Ask any network administrator and he
will tell you that one of the things that he wants to know and be sure of is that what he
thinks is happening on his network IS happening on his network is happening RIGHT
NOW. Like anyone responsible for safeguarding a location, item, or person, finding out
that someone was trying to break into the network or was engaging in a denial-of-service
attack even as few as five minutes ago is often unacceptable.
This is where real-time network analysis has its stake. The ideal of real-time
network analysis is to examine every packet passing through a particular network
segment to determine anomalies, show traffic patterns, and respond to changes or
unauthorized behavior or traffic accordingly. On small, slow, and rarely-used home
networks, this goal may be easily attained; large, fast and busy networks can end up
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overwhelming a single system, causing a bottleneck and degrading network
responsiveness, throughput, and productivity. The goals of real-time network analysis
are to provide as clear a picture of the network and its utilization as possible without
having a detrimental affect on any of the network’s services, usage, or throughput.
[20] discusses a simple, efficient, and effective real-time network analysis
strategy based on a queue structure that samples incoming packets for analysis. By
examining packet frequencies, end points, and end ports, a clearer view of how the
network is utilized is created at that instant. His simple model shows how a large
network can quickly be analyzed for anomalies such as abnormally high traffic patterns
or unexpected traffic types between systems. [20]’s case studies were performed on a
network gateway with a bandwidth of 7 MB and an average of 1000 to 4000 packets
passing through it per second.
Research by [21] on an OC-3 network running at 155 MB was published in 1997.
This group’s work gathered varying statistics from the network such as average packet
size, source information, destination information, and the protocols used to transfer the
information over IP. This statistical sampling was again a rather simple analysis of
network traffic again centered on the basic information gleaned from the header
information on each packet.
The largest hurdle of real-time network analysis is being able to perform an
intensive analysis of every packet in real time without degrading the usability of the
network. [20]’s research showed a node processing 1000 to 4000 packets per second on
average, which translates into an average processing time of 0.00025 to 0.001 seconds to
analyze a packet. When gathering statistics on a network, this limitation can be easily
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met by a few lines of code and a few conditional statements, all of which can be
optimized. The processing time complexity of such a statistical algorithm is low.
Performing an in-depth analysis of the packets based on source, destination, protocol, and
content validity and integrity has a much larger processing time complexity and can
quickly lead to dropped packets and inefficient usage of network resources.
Optimizing analysis code and providing faster support hardware to execute the
analysis code are two common methods for overcoming this boundary, but each has their
own drawbacks. Optimized code is typically limited to the system architecture it is
written for, and faster supporting hardware is often financially burdensome. It is also
difficult to analyze gigabit plus data rates used in inter-backbone communications
reliably.
The next theory is to split the analysis processing into smaller, more manageable
sections such as network segments. While analysis of these smaller, slower segments can
be done with older equipment, this benefit is offset by the necessity of the amount of
equipment required to monitor an entire network. Instead of a single high-performance
system at the entry point to an entire network, there would be multiple inexpensive
systems utilized on the network.
[22] reports that network packet analysis requires too much human and hardware
resources to be used on anything than a small network segment. Requirements for simply
recording all of the traffic without loss of packet data through network saturation or
storage delay are difficult enough to reliably achieve. This group’s body of work
suggests that data analysis post-event allows for a less time-restricted decision to be
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rendered. This also gives the analyst a potentially large body of data to support and
justify any claims made.

2.2.2 Application of Real-time Network Analysis
The applications of real-time network analysis to the problem of network
steganography on the DNS protocol are straightforward. First, we are performing a realtime analysis of the network traffic and attempting to gather usage and packet
characteristics. Our particular problem domain is a subset of the traffic monitored by a
typical network monitor, traffic running to or from port 53. This is the port the Domain
Name Service is commonly available on.
Traffic analysis will look at all packets with a source or destination port of 53 and
perform an in-depth review of these packets to validate packet structure based on the
protocol specifications and network topology. Here we are first concerned with whether
or not the protocol is being utilized properly based on the protocol’s specification.
Traffic failing to conform to the standard or using undefined options are subject to
review. Secondly we are concerned with the traffic’s flow with regards to network
topology based on services available on a specific network segment. There should not be
any DNS requests going to or DNS responses coming from a network segment that does
not have a DNS server. Evidence of the failures is likely to show an improperly
configured machine, incorrect implementations of the DNS protocol, or rogue
applications and servers.
The final application of network analysis to this problem area is a hands-on
approach that modifies packet data. This intensive approach permits rogue packets to be
caught and hopefully rendered inert as they are forwarded on. Unfortunately this
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particular process is extremely invasive, but executed properly results in an entirely
transparent process to honest users. Since our goal is to minimize, if not eliminate covert
communications over DNS, modification of any weak or easily manipulated fields is an
essential portion of our analysis that must be done in real-time.

2.3

Summary
The review of literature provided in this chapter has shown some of the more

recent and prominent research regarding steganography, steganalysis, covert channels,
and real-time network analysis. This body of work will attempt to unify these areas into a
networking tool that will provide a contribution to the field of computer security. It has
become apparent from the research described previously that there is very little attention
paid to covert channels within network communications. Most research for
steganography or covert channels returns some information on network-related fields, but
little information was available beyond the basics concerning specific algorithms or
communications. With the integral parts that communications protocols play in basic
Internet usage, it is disturbing to see that very little research is available to counter the
weaknesses inherent in many protocols. Malicious and rogue users are quick to employ
and utilize such weaknesses to achieve their own goals, yet very little is done to minimize
this risk.
It was also observed that there is a great deal of potential for continuing research
and application of current real-time analysis work with regards to security. The current
trends of analysis rely heavily on gathering basic statistics from network packets to gain a
clearer view of network utilization. It has been shown that analysis can detect unusual
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behaviors such as port scanning [20], but little work is listed about the network
responding to anomalies such as this by bandwidth throttling, packet dropping, or other
techniques. Since we can see the activities occurring in real-time, we should also be able
to respond to them in real-time as well.
The remainder of this thesis will be focused on describing a specific algorithm for
minimizing the capability of covert channels in DNS as well as a generic algorithm for
the achieving the same goal on other protocols. This includes the Network Validated
DNS tool, a tool implemented from this algorithm and drawing its inspiration from
research discussing the capabilities and bandwidth of covert channels.
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Chapter 3
3

Limiting DNS Covert Channels
In chapters 1 and 2 it was observed that there was very little formal research done

to minimize the potential for covert channels in networked systems. Most of the research
provided means of detection, if possible, and does not provide any methods of disabling
or attacking the hidden data. In this chapter, several methods of detection and disabling
are discussed with regards to the DNS protocol. This chapter will form the basis for tools
applying this methodology that will be described in chapter 4.

3.1

Understanding the DNS protocol
The DNS protocol is an integral service of the internet responsible for translating

domain name requests, such as www.wvu.edu, into their corresponding IP addresses
(157.182.140.235). Without DNS, users would be forced to remember a series of
numbers for each site they wanted to visit. Attempts to remember Google
(64.233.167.99), WVU (157.182.140.235), and ZDNet (216.239.115.140) would quickly
devolve into random number guessing and make Internet connectivity little more than a
passing interest, especially should the IP address of the domain change. In chapter 1, it
was mentioned that rogue users could subvert the DNS protocol to use it as a
communications channel. Understanding how the protocol works is essential to all other
aspects of our attempt to control covert channels within it. The following definitions
come from [3] and [9], with definitions from other RFCs included.
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3.1.1 Historical Perspective
Beginning in the 1960s with ARPAnet, hostname to IP address name mappings
were collected, updated and distributed via FTP from the Network Information Center, a
single location on ARPANET. This scheme originally worked well as there were few
hosts and few changes to the network addresses. In the years prior to 1983, the number
of hosts on the Internet had increased dramatically and threatened an explosion of
growth, creating a need for a more efficient and dynamic method of performing domain
name translations. The resulting proposals centered on the concept of a distributed
hierarchical model roughly corresponding to the organizational structure of the domain
names. The basic structure and operation of DNS was implemented in 1983 and was
proposed as an RFC in 1987. [3]
DNS is designed to be as flexible as possible to allow a more general-purpose tool
that can be used across multiple network types with varying domain name structures. It
also is designed to be able to locate data beyond simple IP address mappings, thus
requiring greater flexibility. This flexibility and expansive approach allows for a large
amount of maneuvering room, enough to permit the subversion of the protocol.
The protocol runs primarily over UDP/IP to minimize connection overhead, but
TCP/IP can also be used when data ordering is important or while transferring a large
amount of data. Further historical information can be found in [3] and the following
sections assume that the reader is somewhat familiar with [3] and [9], as well as network
technologies and concepts. Figure 3.1 shows a high-level overview of a DNS packet.
Each section of the DNS packet will be discussed in detail in the following subsections.
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Figure 3-1 DNS Packet Sections Overview
Table 3.1 DNS Packet Sections Description
Field
Header

Description
Contains processing information and protocolspecific options
Questions
Contains the request for an unresolved domain
name or Internet Address
Resource Records Contains response information for the question

3.1.2 Header Definition
Each DNS packet sent and received is composed of a fixed-length header section,
an optional question section, and a variable number of variable length resource records.
The question section is described in section 3.1.3 and the resource records are described
in section 3.1.4.
The header of each DNS packet is a fixed 12 byte length, beginning at the zero
offset of the data section of packet payload. The header is show in figure 3.2 and a brief
description of each field is listed in table 3.2.

Figure 3-2 Packet Header
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Table 3.2 Packet Header Field Definitions
Field
ID
QR
Opcode
AA
TC
RD
RA
Z
Rcode
QDCount
ANCount
NSCount
ARCount

Type
16 bit unsigned int
1 bit
4 bit unsigned int
1 bit
1 bit
1 bit
1 bit
3 bits
4 bit unsigned int
16 bit unsigned int
16 bit unsigned int
16 bit unsigned int
16 bit unsigned int

Valid Values
0 - 2^16-1
0-1
0-2
0-1
0-1
0-1
0-1
0
0–5
0 - 2^16-1
0 - 2^16-1
0 - 2^16-1
0 - 2^16-1

Description
ID assigned by program generating DNS query
Query (0) or Response (1)
Describes the type of query
Authoritative Answer
TrunCated message indicator
Recursion Desired
Recursion Available
Reserved
Response Code
Number of questions encoded
Number of answers encoded
Number of Nameservers encoded
Number of Additional Records encoded

The field definitions listed above are fairly straightforward and simple to
understand, just as the values for each field based on a condition set are simple to
understand. The definition of the header field includes a number of specific conditions
that must be met for the values in each field to be valid. These specifics will be discussed
further in sections 3.2 and 3.3.

3.1.3 Question Section Definition
Every DNS packet typically has a question included in its contents. Questions
form the basis of the client aspect of the client-server relationship DNS functions. The
question section of the DNS protocol is a variable length field followed by two fixedlength fields. Figure 3.3 shows the layout of the question section and table 3.3 contain
descriptions of the field types and the values permitted for each field.
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Figure 3-3 Question Format
Table 3.3 Question Field Definitions
Field
Qname
Qtype
Qclass

Type
Valid Values
<Domain-name> See syntax table
16 bit unsigned int 1-16, 252-255
16 bit unsigned int 1-4

Description
Domain Name of the question
Type of query requested
Query class format

3.1.4 Resource Record Definitions
Each DNS packet optionally contains one or more variable length and structure
items known as resource records. Resource records contain varying types of data such as
IP addresses, start of authority records, and mailbox information. By far, this portion of
the packet is the most important portion of the packet being transmitted as it handles
numerous data types. Regardless of the data types being passed, each resource record has
a header specifying the record’s name, type, class, time to live, and data length. The data
portion of the record immediately follows the data length field and is formatted according
to the type and class fields specified. Figure 3.4 describes the resource record format
while table 3.4 describes the field names and types.
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Figure 3-4 Resource Record Format
Table 3.4 Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
Name
Type
Class
TTL
RDLength
Rdata

Type
<Domain-name>
16 bit unsigned int
16 bit unsigned int
32 bit unsigned int
16 bit unsigned int
Varies by Type

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Node to which this resource record pertains
1 - 16
Type code determining structure of the Rdata
1–4
Class code for determining format of the Rdata
0-(2^32)-1
Time To Live
0-(2^16)-1
Size of the Rdata structure
See Type table Data of the Resource Record, determined by type code

The type field is responsible for determining the structure of the data portion of
the resource record. The class field is primarily used to specify the data format based on
the addressing format used: Internet, CSNet, CHAOS, or Hesiod. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 list
the valid types and classes per [3] and [9]. The following subsections will explain the
structure of the resource record for each type value.
Table 3.5 Resource Record Types
Name
A
NS
MD
MF
CNAME
SOA
MB
MG
MR
NULL

Value
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Description
Answer
Authoritative Name Server
Mail Destination
Mail Forwarder
Canonical name for alias
Start of Zone Authority
Mailbox domain name
Mail group domain name
Mail rename domain name
Any data valid
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WKS
PTR
HINFO
MINFO
MX
TXT
AFXR
MAILB
MAILA
*

11
12
13
14
15
16
252
253
254
255

Well-Known Service
Domain Name Pointer
Host Information
Mailbox/Mail list information
Mail Exchange
Text Strings
Entire Zone Transfer
Request for Mailbox-related records
Request for all mail agents
Request for all records

Table 3.6 Resource Record Classes
Name Value Description
IN
1 Internet
CS
2 CSNet
CH
3 CHAOS Net
HS
4 Hesiod

3.1.3.1 – Type A

Figure 3-5 Type A Resource Record Format
Table 3.7 Type A Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
ADDRESS

Type
32 bit IP Address

Valid Values
0-(2^32)-1

Description
IP Address

3.1.3.2 – Type NS

Figure 3-6 Type NS Resource Record Format
Table 3.8 Type NS Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
NSDNAME

Type
<Domain-name>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Authoritative Nameserver
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3.1.3.3 – Type MD

Figure 3-7 Type MD Resource Record Format
Table 3.9 Type MD Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
MADNAME

Type
<Domain-name>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Mail Destination

Notes
Obsolete

3.1.3.4 – Type MF

Figure 3-8 Type MF Resource Record Format
Table 3.10 Type MF Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
MFRDATA

Type
<Domain-name>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Mail Forwarder

Notes
Obsolete

3.1.3.5 – Type CName

Figure 3-9 Type CNAME Resource Record Format
Table 3.11 Type CNAME Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
CNAME

Type
<Domain-name>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Canonical name for an alias
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3.1.3.6 – Type SOA

Figure 3-10 Type SOA Resource Record Format
Table 3.12 Type SOA Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
MNAME

Type
<Domain-name>

RNAME

<Domain-name>

SERIAL

32 bit unsigned int

REFRESH

32 bit unsigned int

RETRY

32 bit unsigned int

EXPIRE

32 bit unsigned int

MINIMUM

32 bit unsigned int

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Primary nameserver for
zone data
See syntax table Zone administrator's
Mailbox
0 - (2^32)-1
Original version number of
zone
0 - (2^32)-1
Time interval before zone
refresh
0 - (2^32)-1
Time interval before zone
refresh on failed
0 - (2^32)-1
Time limit before zone no
longer authoritative
0 - (2^32)-1
Minimum TTL field exported
from this zone
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3.1.3.7 – Type MB

Figure 3-11 Type MB Resource Record Format
Table 3.13 Type MB Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
MADNAME

Type
<Domain-name>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Host containing the
specified mailbox

Notes
Experimental

3.1.3.8 – Type MG

Figure 3-12 Type MG Resource Record Format
Table 3.14 Type MG Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
MGMNAME

Type
<Domain-name>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Specifies member mailbox
of mail group specified by
domain

Notes
Experimental

3.1.3.9 – Type MR

Figure 3-13 Type MR Resource Record Format
Table 3.15 Type MR Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
NEWNAME

Type
<Domain-name>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Specifies mailbox which is
the proper rename of
specified mailbox

Notes
Experimental
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3.1.3.10 – Type NULL

Figure 3-14 Type NULL Resource Record Format
Table 3.16 Type NULL Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
Type
Valid Values
<ANYTHING> <8 bit unsigned int> Any value

Description
Notes
Field permitting any kinds of Experimental
values to be input. Used for
testing.

3.1.3.11 – Type WKS

Figure 3-15 Type WKS Resource Record Format
Table 3.17 Type WKS Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
ADDRESS
Protocol

Type
32 bit IP Address
8 bit unsigned int

<BIT-MAP>

8 bit unsigned int

Valid Values
Description
0 - (2^32)-1
IP Address
6 (TCP), 17(UDP) Protocol number as
determined by IANA for IP
0 - 255
Bitmap showing available
service ports on the
specified IP Address

3.1.3.12 – Type PTR

Figure 3-16 Type PTR Resource Record Format
Table 3.18 Type PTR Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
PTRDNAME

Type
<Domain-name>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Pointer to some location in
the domain name space
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3.1.3.13 – Type HINFO

Figure 3-17 Type HINFO Resource Record Format
Table 3.19 Type HINFO Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
CPU
OS

Type
<character-string>
<character-string>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Specifies host CPU type
See syntax table Specifies host OS

Notes
40 char max
40 char max

3.1.3.14 – Type MINFO

Figure 3-18 Type MINFO Resource Record Format
Table 3.20 Type MINFO Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
RMAILBOX

Type
<Domain-name>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Specifies mailbox
responsible for mailing list
or mailbox

EMAILBOX

<Domain-name>

See syntax table Specifies mailbox to receive
error messages

3.1.3.15 – Type MX

Figure 3-19 Type MX Resource Record Format
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Table 3.21 Type MX Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
Type
PREFERENCE 16 bit unsigned int

Valid Values
0 - (2^16)-1

EXCHANGE

See syntax table Specifies mailbox to receive
error messages

<Domain-name>

Description
Specifies mailbox
responsible for mailing list
or mailbox

3.1.3.16 – Type TXT

Figure 3-20 Type TXT Resource Record Format
Table 3.22 Type TXT Resource Record Field Definitions
Field
TXT-DATA

Type
<character-string>

Valid Values
Description
See syntax table Holds descriptive text

Table 3.6 listed the legal class values permitted and defined in [3] and [9]. The
most prevalent class value in use is class 1, Internet, but the protocol’s designers wanted
DNS to be a flexible service, so the values for CSNet, CHAOS, and Hesiod were
included to allow for cross-addressing protocol communications. For the purpose of this
research, non-Internet protocols were included, but specifics of the varying class types
will not be discussed in the paper.

3.1.5 Syntax and Compression
There are two further pieces of information that must be understood to fully
understand the DNS protocol: syntax and message compression.
3.1.5.1 Message Syntax
Throughout the definitions of the resource records, references were made to a data
type known as <Domain-name>. Table 3.23 breaks this data type into its atomic pieces
and defines the valid values.
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Table 3.23 Message Syntax Definition
Field
<Domain-name>
<subdomain>
<label>
<ldh-str>
<let-dig-hyp>
<let-dig>
<letter>
<digit>

Definition
<subdomain> | " "
<label> | <subdomain> "." <label>
<let-dig>[[<ldh-str>]<let-dig>]
<let-dig-hyp> | <let-dig-hyp> <ldh-str>
<let-dig> | "-"
<letter> | <digit>
A - Z, a – z
0–9

Each label begins with an octet defining the length of the following label, and a
series of labels is always terminated by a zero or null octet. In addition to the syntax
listed above, there are several length requirements that must be met. The first is each
label’s length is limited to 63 bytes at a maximum. The reason for this limit will be
discussed under message compression. The final requirement for a series of labels is that
the maximum length of all of the labels, including the label length octets, is 255 octets.
IP addresses can also be encoded as part of a DNS request, but their format seems
opposite that of a standard domain name. A request for 64.233.167.99 would be encoded
as 99.167.233.64.IN-ADDR.ARPA.
The resource record definitions also made reference to a data type listed as
<character-string>. Unless otherwise specified, this data type is characterized by a single
label length octet followed by that number of characters, making the maximum permitted
length of the character data and the length octet 256 characters. The information in the
data type is treated as binary information. <Character-string> can be expressed in two
ways: as a set of contiguous characters lacking spaces, or as a string encapsulated within
a pair of quotation marks (“). Strings encapsulated within quotation marks containing
quotation marks themselves must be quoted using the backslash.
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3.1.5.2 Message Compression
In order to minimize the size of a message by removing redundant information,
inline message pointers were implemented in the body of the DNS packet for the Name
data type of the resource record, allowing data from one record to be utilized in another
record. This concept is illustrated in figure 3.21 below. The top line is the offset value
from the packet start, boldface characters are ASCII values, and regular characters are
integer values.

Figure 3-21 Message Compression Example

As we can see, ns1.nameserversite.com becomes the only fully domain name used
in the entire packet, even though there are eight nameservers listed. Records ns2 through
ns8 point to the offset in the packet where .nameserver.com originate, saving a significant
amount of data per resource record. Message Compression is indicated by setting the
first two high-order bits of a label length octet to 1. The remaining 6 bits of that octet and
the following octet form the offset from the start of the packet where the next portion of
the domain name can be found. It is possible for a single domain name to have multiple
pointers, such as the described in figure 3-22.
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Figure 3-22 Multiple Inline Pointers

Thus, we see that the resource record for www.lcsee.cemr.wvu.edu has two
pointers for message compression. Pointers can also be used to start a domain name, as
shown by the last entry in figure 3.22. Here we have a record that is part of the
www.wvu.edu record, and to compress the record data, the record begins with a pointer
to the original www.wvu.edu record. These are slightly simplistic examples, but we can
see how message compression can be utilized to minimize the size of a DNS packet.

3.1.6 Summary
This subsection was intended to be an informational overview describing the DNS
protocol at a slightly higher-level while maintaining enough technical content to allow a
proper analysis of the protocol definition in section 3.2. In this subsection, all valid
syntax and values were defined for each of the fields and a number of condition sets were
created, all of which will be used in aiding our analysis and response.
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3.2

Identification of Fields
In order for a protocol to be subverted and remain inconspicuous and valid to

anyone weakly monitoring the data, a certain amount of weakness must be present in the
protocol’s definition. In this section, the protocol definitions are broken into several
categories based on their requirements as part of the packet and whether the legal values
are completely set. The four resulting categories are as follows:
•

Required strong fields – Fields that must be present and must have a set value to
be valid

•

Required weak fields – Fields that must be present but do not require a specific
value to function

•

Optional strong fields – Fields that may be present and must have a set value to be
valid

•

Optional weak fields – Fields that may be present but do not require a specific
value to function

The reason we are breaking these down is these fields all take up a certain portion
of the transmission channel bandwidth and therefore affect the amount of data that can be
transmitted in each packet. Table 3.24 below shows a breakdown of the four fields as
each relates to the packet bandwidth.
Table 3.24 Packet Type Breakdown
Type
Values
Required Strong
Weak
Optional Strong
Weak

Bits per Packet
RS
RW
OS
OW
RS+RW+OS+OW=Packet size
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However, as this relates to covert channels, the weak fields represent the maximum bits
per packet that can supposedly be transmitted without affecting the operation of the
protocol. In effect, this value is lower as there are still some requirements placed on the
syntax and format of the data.

3.2.1 Required fields
Research and understanding of the DNS protocol leads to the conclusion that the
only required portion of the protocol that was to be present in every packet is the header
section. From here, review of the fields within the header revealed that only one field
with a required value: the Z field where all bits within this field must be zero. The rest of
the fields were set according to direction and packet information and were therefore
classified as required weak fields. Table 3.25 contains a full list of the findings.

Table 3.25 Required Strong and Weak Fields
Strong Fields Value Weak Fields
Z
0
ID
QR
AA
TC
RD
RA

OPCODE
RCODE
QDCOUNT
ANCOUNT
NSCOUNT
ARCOUNT

3.2.2 Optional fields
The question section and resource records were determined to be optional sections
as they were not required in every packet like the header. The fields of the question and
record portion of the protocol were found to be composed entirely of weak fields and
were classified as such. Resource record structures based on class type were also
examined for weak and strong fields. Table 3.26 contains a comprehensive list of the
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varying type value structures and their definitions. Review of these fields show that no
field has any strong fields, so all of the type value definitions were classified as optional
weak fields since their parent, the resource record, is optional.

Table 3.26 Optional Weak Fields
Weak Fields
QNAME
QTYPE
QCLASS
NAME
TYPE
CLASS
PREFERENCE

3.3

TTL
RDLENGTH
RDATA
ADDRESS
NSDNAME
MADNAME
EXCHANGE

CNAME
MNAME
RNAME
SERIAL
REFRESH
RETRY
TXT-DATA

EXPIRE
MINIMUM
MGMNAME
NEWNAME
<ANYTHING>
PROTOCOL

<BIT-MAP>
PTRDNAME
CPU
OS
RMAILBOX
EMAILBOX

Network Topology Awareness
While format requirements and valid data ranges can help minimize the

subversion of the protocol, the direction and types of traffic transmitted across the
network can impact the usage of covert channels. DNS is a client-server protocol where
a request is made to a server and the server responds with an answer. It is common for
the DNS server for one client to itself become a client to another DNS server in order to
resolve a particular request. The hierarchical nature of DNS paints a portrait of a network
designed as shown in figure 3.23.
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Figure 3-23 Example Network Layout

It is from the network’s topology that we further pare down the permissible
options and fields to a subset of valid options based on the network structure. For
example, DNS traffic coming from the 157.182.213.X network does not have a DNS
server in that particular collision domain, so we can effectively rule out specific values
and options in a number of weak fields due to the expected types of traffic coming from a
particular network segment. Due to the client-server nature of DNS, a second
categorization of the fields into client and server functionality occurred.
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It was noted that since servers could also act as clients, the categories would be
divided into server-only, client-server, and client-only, where the client-only fields were
for machines that were strictly end-systems, while servers potentially utilized the whole
set of DNS fields and functionality. Server-only categories of functionality are intended
for DNS servers on the absolute root of the domain hierarchy, such as .com, .org, and .net
servers. However, due to the nature of the protocol, this server-only division is not
guaranteed. It has been included as a category as theoretically it is possible to have a
system that behaves as a pure server.
By being aware of the network’s topology and of the expected services
permissible in a segment, we can further reduce the capabilities of covert channels in
DNS. Tables 3.27 and 3.28 contain a list of client-only fields and valid values for both
incoming and outgoing traffic. Tables 3.29 and 3.30 contain a listing of server-only
fields and the valid values for incoming and outgoing traffic. Certain inbound and
outbound types have been excluded as the resource record definitions for those types are
not permitted.

44

Table 3.27 Client-Only Expected Field Values
Field Name
ID
QR
OPCODE
AA
TC
RD
RA
Z
RCODE
QDCOUNT
ANCOUNT
NSCOUNT
ARCOUNT
QNAME
QTYPE
QCLASS
NAME
TYPE
CLASS
TTL
RDLENGTH
RDATA

Outbound
Any
0
0-2
0
0
0,1
0
000
0
1
0
0
0
<Domain-name>
1-16, 252-255
1-4
-

Inbound
Matches previous outbound
1
0-2
0,1
Usually 0
0
0,1
000
0-5
1
0 - (2^16)-1
0 - (2^16)-1
0 - (2^16)-1
Matches previous outbound
Matches previous outbound
Matches previous outbound
<Domain-name>
1 - 16
1-4
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^16)-1
See Client RR table
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Table 3.28 Client-Only Expected RR Values
RR Type
A
NS
MD
MF
CN
SOA

MB
MG
MR
NULL
WKS

PTR
HINFO
MINFO
MX
TXT

Field
ADDRESS
NSDNAME
MADNAME
MADNAME
CNAME
MNAME
RNAME
SERIAL
REFRESTH
RETRY
EXPIRE
MINIMUM
MADNAME
MGMNAME
NEWNAME
<ANYTHING>
ADDRESS
PROTOCOL
<BIT-MAP>
PTRDNAME
CPU
OS
RMAILBOX
EMAILBOX
PREFERENCE
EXCHANGE
TXT-DATA

Inbound
32 bit IP address - Some exceptions
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^32)-1
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
Anything
32 bit IP address - Some exceptions
6 (TCP), 17 (UDP)
0 - 255
<Domain-name>
<character-string>
<character-string>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
0 - (2^16)-1
<Domain-name>
<character-string>[<character-string>]
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Table 3.29 Server-Only Expected Field Values
Field Name
ID
QR
OPCODE
AA
TC
RD
RA
Z
RCODE
QDCOUNT
ANCOUNT
NSCOUNT
ARCOUNT
QNAME
QTYPE
QCLASS
NAME
TYPE
CLASS
TTL
RDLENGTH
RDATA

Outbound
Matches previous inbound
1
0-2
0,1
Usually 0
0
0,1
000
0-5
1
0 - (2^16)-1
0 - (2^16)-1
0 - (2^16)-1
Matches previous inbound
Matches previous inbound
Matches previous inbound
<Domain-name>
1 - 16
1-4
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^16)-1
See Server RR table

Inbound
Any
0
0-2
0
0
0,1
0
000
0
1
0
0
0
<Domain-name>
1-16, 252-255
1-4
-
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Table 3.30 Server-Only Expected RR Values
RR Type
A
NS
MD
MF
CN
SOA

MB
MG
MR
NULL
WKS

PTR
HINFO
MINFO
MX
TXT

3.4

Field
ADDRESS
NSDNAME
MADNAME
MADNAME
CNAME
MNAME
RNAME
SERIAL
REFRESTH
RETRY
EXPIRE
MINIMUM
MADNAME
MGMNAME
NEWNAME
<ANYTHING>
ADDRESS
PROTOCOL
<BIT-MAP>
PTRDNAME
CPU
OS
RMAILBOX
EMAILBOX
PREFERENCE
EXCHANGE
TXT-DATA

Outbound
32 bit IP address - Some exceptions
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^32)-1
0 - (2^32)-1
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
Anything
32 bit IP address - Some exceptions
6 (TCP), 17 (UDP)
0 - 255
<Domain-name>
<character-string>
<character-string>
<Domain-name>
<Domain-name>
0 - (2^16)-1
<Domain-name>
<character-string>[<character-string>]

Identifying and Limiting Covert Channels
In sections 3.2 and 3.3, we identified a number of protocol- and network-specific

constraints that were to be followed in order to maintain compliance with the protocol’s
standards. With these constraints in mind, a series of permitted operations based on the
protocol and network layout from our lists can be derived. We can generate rule listings
based on tables 3.27, 3.28, 3.29, and 3.30 that were in turn derived from the protocol and
network definitions.
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From tables 3.27 and 3.28, we can see that the rule set for the client side is fairly
simple, depending on the functionality we want to permit on the network segment.
However, the question of how we detect covert channels remains. The most obvious way
to detect them is to see which, if any, of the rules a packet fails and then paying special
attention to that packet. This is the most obvious way to detect covert channels, but does
not mean that the other packets do not have covert transmissions hidden within.
Since we are not able to fully detect all types of covert communications, the
option we have is to manage all fields not requiring an explicit value to function, such as
the ID field. Limiting the potential for covert communications can be achieved by
placing a layer of abstraction between the user’s computer and the outgoing network
interface from a segment. In this model, when a packet is received, all fields except the
data payload field are rewritten or regenerated, and then the query is passed on to the
DNS server. The ID field, which may previously have had a value of 1042, may now
have a value of 249 courtesy of a random number generator. The response from the
server is processed in a similar manner, removing any invalid response options, and the
original field data with a reply is returned to the user. Regular users see nothing amiss
while rogue users may be forced to utilize another method to transmit their data.

3.5

Response Options
Once identification of a covert channel has occurred, the question of how to

respond to the channel remains. From the steganography model, there are three options
we can glean from the portrayal of Alice, Bob, and the warden: Permit, Drop, and
Reprocess.
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The option to respond by permitting all traffic is a response that trusts the packets
passing through without any question. Packets failing the filtering rule are permitted to
continue on without any modifications or other response. Any type of network
implementing this choice long-term does not require any type of validation service unless
looking for unexpected services or monitoring traffic.
Choosing to drop any packets failing the filtering rules is the second of the three
options derived from the warden’s portrayal. With this choice, packets failing any of the
filters are simply discarded as though they were dropped somewhere along the line by the
network. This implementation choice can cause a buildup of DNS traffic on the segment
as the protocol’s definition suggests a number of times to retry a request following the
lack of a response within an allotted time period. Small network segments without a
large amount of DNS traffic can utilize this measure with little impact on network
responsiveness.
Reprocessing a message is the equivalent of the active warden model, where the
warden takes a message from Alice, types it up on the typewriter and performs some
other analysis on it, and then gives it to Bob. The application of this model to the
problem of DNS covert channels involves rewriting as much of the packet as possible
without losing the meaning of the message being passed. In this application,
reprocessing would entail overwriting every field failing the filtering rules and other
fields whose modification does not impact the packet integrity.
The response options given by steganalysis are simple concepts that can be used
to disrupt and combat steganography attempts in general. Covert channels are a specific
field within steganography, but are still susceptible to these response techniques, albeit
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varying from those of images or video. The difficulty with covert channels lies in the
fact that the communications are not typically stored to disk like images and video. With
covert communications, a decision must be rendered nearly instantaneously on a limited
amount of data.

3.6

Additional Considerations
Minimizing and eliminating the capabilities of covert channels is a difficult

process as there are many ways to hide data within legitimate communications. With this
in mind, there are several additional considerations that must be taken by one attempting
to limit covert channels.

3.6.1 Standard Revisions
The internet and its communication protocols are constantly evolving, adding new
features, making others obsolete, and competing with other protocols for implementation.
This document and its content used [3] and [9] to generate the rule listings and tables
found within. There have been a number of proposed and accepted updates to these
documents that add additional features like DNSSEC. Other revisions and clarifications
are sure to follow in the future as demand for additional functionality from the protocol
increases. Each new revision will require analysis, verification, and some means of
permitting backwards compatibility to older protocol definitions.

3.6.2 Covert Channel Logging
A facet of communications protocols that is often overlooked is the packaging
that holds the specific data desired. The packaging explains a number of things about the
data encoded within, but is discarded once the packet reaches its endpoint and is decoded.
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The choice to discard all of the communications except the specific data is potentially
limiting as we cannot later review all the data in the packet should a new method of
analysis become available. Consciously copying all of the original data on its way from
the client and from the outside server allows for later review of the data and its packaging
for covert transmissions. This storage of the whole packet allows for a thorough, longterm analysis of packet data for covert messages.

3.6.3 Network Issues
Two issues arise from the network structure that must be addressed to ensure
validation of all DNS traffic: deployment location and packet routing.
The goal is to analyze all DNS packets coming and going through a particular
network segment, so the most logical placement of a device to handle this task would be
on the gateway. Here all traffic entering and leaving the segment would be forced to go
through the single location leading to the next level of the network. This location
presents a somewhat unexpected problem in that packets leaving the segment are
monitored, but packets remaining in the segment that never attempt leave the segment fail
to go through the gateway and therefore are not processed.
The second routing problem theoretically results from deviation from the
expected routing structure of the DNS hierarchy. DNS queries are supposed go through a
specific hierarchy of name servers to obtain a response. Typically, addresses for name
servers are determined by DHCP or are set by a network administrator. In a typical
model, queries would go to these servers first and then head out of the network. A rogue
user specifying a DNS request to a name server outside of the network can avoid the
hierarchy and theoretically validation as well.
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With these problems in mind, we would want to ensure all traffic leaving or
staying in the segment is validated. This suggests a means of forwarding all DNS packets
received on a segment to first go through the validation mechanism prior to being sent to
their intended destination.
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Chapter 4
4
NV-DNS
NV-DNS is a Domain Name Service packet processor that checks and validates
DNS packets for correctness, validity, and other implementation errors. The intent of this
program is to evaluate DNS communications for hidden or covert channels within the
contents of the packet. In addition, NV-DNS will aid security professionals and software
designers in providing a more secure networked computing environment. Inspiration
from this program came from the concept of real-time network analysis, where packets
are examined and recorded for usage statistics.
NV-DNS processes incoming UDP-based DNS packets based on the specification
of the Domain Name Service in RFC 1034 and RFC 1035. [3], [9] it utilizes a
configuration file to determine the permissible DNS options and classes on a particular
network segment. Based on this configuration, the program also executes a set of desired
actions to perform on packets failing configuration rules. Ideally NV-DNS is a
monitoring tool set on network gateways to determine the validity of the communications
passing through. It can also be used to push software designers towards networkvalidating software to minimize the possibility of rogue programs subverting protocols
for unauthorized use.
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4.1

Architectural Overview
NV-DNS is composed of three main components:
•

The Packet Parser

•

The Validation Module

•

The Packet Crafter

The Packet Parser is responsible for parsing DNS packets into its various fields to
allow for simpler validation. The Validation Module processes the packet based on a rule
filter to check for invalid values and fields, determining if the packet is a candidate for
any type of covert communications. The Packet Crafter repackages the packet based on
the rule filter and overwrites some fields based on the necessity of the field data, like the
ID field.
The design of NV-DNS is intended to allow for a high degree of flexibility and
maintainability. With these aspects of development in mind, the components of this tool
were implemented in a modular fashion that permits simple upkeep of the current
modules or replacement of the modules with their own without affecting program
functionality. Figure 4.1 shows a simple diagram describing the flow of NV-DNS and
will be used as the foundation for describing the tool’s functionality.
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Figure 4-1 NV-DNS Flowchart
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Connections for incoming DNS requests are received and the packet is fed into
the Packet Parser, which simply breaks the packet into specific fields to allow for easier
validation. Once the packet has been parsed, the Validation Module tests the packet
structure based on the packet’s direction, network topology of the segment, and
adherence to protocol specifications. The validation rules are loaded from a
configuration file previously generated by a network administrator. The resulting
validation response is fed into the Packet Crafter and a new packet is crafted with valid
data and sent off to the next-level DNS server. The program awaits a response and
processes the response in the same way that the request was processed. The original
request and response are also stored to disk with packet header information.

4.1.1 The Packet Parser
The Packet Parser is responsible for breaking the DNS packet into the varying
fields to assist in analysis of the packet data. This includes pulling the specific bit fields
out of the header and converting bits into numbers. The methodology chosen to create a
structure suitable for validation is not intended to be the fastest or most efficient means of
validation, but the simplest. Memory is allocated for a structure that contains the DNS
fields and their values, and the data is parsed into the allocated fields. During this
parsing, data is converted, packed, or unpacked into its respective fields before being
returned to the calling routine. The newly allocated structure is then passed on to the
validation module that performs the tedious task of reviewing the values in each of the
fields.
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4.1.2 The Validation Module
The Validation Module is the second major component of NV-DNS and is easily
the most complex module of the system. It is also by far the most important component
of NV-DNS. This particular module must validate all portions of the DNS protocol
specification and must also account for network location rules. The concept of having
some type of off-system validation mechanism was influenced heavily by the RFCs
trusting implementation and utilization in “good faith” to the programmers. Secondary
influences for off-system validation are found littered throughout research papers and
articles on steganalysis and covert channels.
Validation of all aspects of a protocol based on its definition is a potentially
difficult task. Every valid combination of the protocol definition must be processed as
valid while any invalid combinations or definitions must be appropriately labeled as such.
Implementing code to properly analyze and validate the protocol is the most difficult
portion of the NV-DNS program. The validation of the protocol based on traffic
direction is a much simpler validation to make in terms of complexity as there are only
two directions to traffic. Most of the functions can be grouped into a few basic rule sets
on either direction, thus minimizing the complexity of this type of validation. Once
validation is complete and a response code has been generated by the module, the
response code and packet are passed on to the final module.

4.1.3 The Packet Crafter
The last module being discussed is the Packet Crafter, which can be an optional
module in the system. The purpose of the module is evident from its name, but for some
reasons which may not be fully obvious at first glance. As the name implies, this
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particular module crafts a new DNS request or response from the input it receives from
the Validation Module and originally the Packet Parser. The main reason for crafting a
new packet is to minimize the chance an undetected covert channel could survive intact.
By removing and potentially restructuring the packet, we can further attack any potential
covert channels by scrambling the data ordering of a query or reply.

4.2

Further Considerations
In this section, the components of NV-DNS were outlined and a reasonable scope

of the prototype’s functionality was described. There are a number of other challenges
associated with this tool that are beyond the scope of this research. However, it is
anticipated that the work done here will provide a foundation for future covert channel
work.
In the next chapter, we discuss the implementation of NV-DNS and several case
studies conducted to determine how reasonable the prototype is.
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Chapter 5
5 Applications of NV-DNS
This chapter will discuss a rudimentary implementation of Network-Validated
Domain Name Service (NV-DNS) designed with the purpose of applying steganalysis
techniques of covert channels and real-time network analysis to the problem of
identifying and limiting covert channels in the DNS protocol and being able to respond to
these known and potentially unknown channels in real-time.
In the previous chapter, the architecture of NV-DNS was discussed in detail. The
version of NV-DNS presented here is in no way intended to be complete and is only
capable of handling a small amount of DNS traffic at a time. Further, only simple
versions of the Packet Parser, Validation Module, and Packet Crafter are implemented.

5.1

Implementation Language
C was chosen as the implementation language due to the high level of control

capabilities afforded by the language and a mostly standard implementation across
platforms. The complete listing for the source code along with a user’s guide is presented
in Appendix A.

5.2

Caveats
NV-DNS is in no way a completely stand-alone protection method against covert

channels in the DNS protocol. Some of the major problems encountered with
implementing the tool are:
•

NV-DNS must be able to recover from all errors without any side effects as a
failure to recover results in inaccessibility of service to end hosts.
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•

The current implementation of NV-DNS is not time or usage sensitive and does
not use a modified version of [20]’s analysis model to analyze the frequency of
the requests.

•

The current implementation is not meant for any type of high-performance
analysis.

•

The current implementation does not keep a cache of requests and replies to
improve response time and localize covert channel communications.

•

NV-DNS in its current implementation does not handle TCP-based DNS or most
server communications.

•

The current implementation is not multi-threaded and does not write data to the
network.

5.3

Applying NV-DNS
Once NV-DNS was successfully able to continually run transparently and without

error, the next step was to determine how well the program responded to a mixed group
of valid and invalid DNS requests. A covert channel packet encoder/decoder was created
to test the full capabilities of NV-DNS. A small text file was used as the data feed for the
covert channel. The source code listing for the program is in Appendix B. User’s guides
for the programs are also available in their respective appendices. The results from the
program are shown in Appendix C.

61

5.4

Summary
This chapter discussed the implementation of a very rudimentary version of

Network-Validated Domain Name Service that was capable, to a degree, of identifying
and limiting covert channels on a client-only network segment. The data generated by
NV-DNS is a copy of the original request and reply received by the program that can be
reviewed in the future to permit the application of future analysis techniques on the
protocol.
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Chapter 6
6
Summary and Conclusion
6.1

Summary and Conclusion
The research conducted for this thesis resulted in the design of a potentially useful

framework for providing security professionals, network administrators, and developers
with a means of effectively limiting the capability of covert channels within DNS
communications.
The major drawback of the goal of limiting covert channels within DNS
communications lies in the required functionality of the protocol. There is only so much
information that can be specified independently of the user before some input from the
user is required for the protocol to work. This leaves the potential for validated requests
that contain some type of covert channel to be assembled at another location without any
trouble. However, the work provided within this document is surely a significant step
towards limiting covert channels within a protocol.
This research also focused on the construction of a rudimentary validation tool
known as NV-DNS inspired by research in real-time network analysis to apply some type
of real-time network validation of a packet’s structure and information. NV-DNS as
implemented and described in this work is only capable of handling a minimal number of
concurrent DNS requests and replies. The tool could be used to identify and limit a
number of covert channel requests but due to the simplicity of the detection algorithms,
was unable to discover a broader range of covert channel attempts without further
implementation.
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6.2

Future Work

The following work may be considered as a future project:
•

Providing full standard compliance for the DNS protocol.

•

Implementing additional detection and response features, such as those suggested
by [20].

•

Development of a more efficient, multithreaded version of NV-DNS.

•

Implementation of NV-DNS with a DNS server.

•

Implementation of an analysis tool to review saved packets.
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Appendix A
NV-DNS
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A.1

Overview
This appendix provides a listing of the NV-DNS tool discussed in Chapters 4 and

5. C was the chosen implementation language for the tool due to its high level of control
and mostly standard implementation across platforms.

A.2

Usage
To utilize NV-DNS, issue the command: nvdns IP filename. The IP argument

indicates the DNS server or resolver for the current network segment. The argument
filename indicates to the program the name of the file that the received packets should be
written to. This represents the path and name of the file to be written.

A.3

Source Code Listing

A.3.1 defines.h
/****************************************************/
/* NV-DNS
*/
/* Author
: Rex McCracken
*/
/* Date Created : September 24 2004
*/
/* Last Modified
: December 1 2004
*/
/* Description
: Program to remove covert
*/
/*
channels in DNS packets
*/
/****************************************************/
/*
DNS-specific definitions
Per RFCs 1034 and 1035
Type values
Class values
Error codes
*/
/* General defines */
#define MAX_UDP_SIZE 512
#define DNS_PORT 53
/* Network error defines */
#define ERROR_SOCKET_UNBOUND -100
#define ERROR_BIND_ERROR -101
/* DNS Header offsets
#define HEADER_QR 0x80

*/
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#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
/* End

HEADER_OPCODE 0x78
HEADER_AA 0x04
HEADER_TC 0x02
HEADER_RD 0x01
HEADER_RA 0x80
HEADER_Z 0x70;
HEADER_RCODE 0x0F
DNS Header offsets

/* Error Codes */
#define INVALID_QR
#define INVALID_OPCODE
#define INVALID_AA
#define INVALID_TC
#define INVALID_RD
#define INVALID_RA
#define INVALID_Z
#define INVALID_RCODE
#define INVALID_QDCOUNT
#define INVALID_ANCOUNT
#define INVALID_NSCOUNT
#define INVALID_ARCOUNT
#define INVALID_QTYPE
#define INVALID_QCLASS
#define INVALID_TYPE
#define INVALID_CLASS
#define INVALID_ADDRESS
#define INVALID_PROTOCOL
#define INVALID_DOMAIN
#define INVALID_POINTER
#define INVALID_STRING
#define INVALID_PARSING

*/
0x80000001
0x80000002
0x80000004
0x80000008
0x80000010
0x80000020
0x80000040
0x80000080
0x80000100
0x80000200
0x80000400
0x80000800
0x80001000
0x80002000
0x80004000
0x80008000
0x80010000
0x80020000
0x80040000
0x80080000
0x80100000
0x80200000

A.3.2 dnstype.h
/****************************************************/
/* NV-DNS
*/
/* Author
: Rex McCracken
*/
/* Date Created : September 24 2004
*/
/* Last Modified
: December 1 2004
*/
/* Description
: Program to remove covert
*/
/*
channels in DNS packets
*/
/****************************************************/

#include "defines.h"
/* DNS type function prototypes

*/

#define INBOUND 1
#define OUTBOUND 0
typedef struct dns_def_type {
short unsigned int pid;
char qr;
short unsigned int opcode;
char aa;
char tc;
char rd;
char ra;
char z;
short unsigned int rcode;
short unsigned int qdcount;
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short unsigned int ancount;
short unsigned int nscount;
short unsigned int arcount;
char data[MAX_UDP_SIZE];
int data_len;
} dns_def;
/* DNS Parse
Inputs:
data
character pointer to the packet received
Outputs:
dns_def*

Pointer to allocated memory structure
*/
dns_def *dnsparse(char *data);
/* Process Packet
Inputs:
dns
Pointer to the parsed DNS packet
direction Traffic flow direction
Outputs:
int

Error code
*/
int process_packet(dns_def *dns, int direction);
/* Packet Crafter
Inputs:
dns
Pointer to dns_def struct holding the DNS packet
ndata
Pointer to new packet buffer
idbuffer Pointer to stored ID header
fields
Error code for the fields that need overwritten
direction Direction of the traffic flow
Outputs:
int

Number of characters the ndata buffer is
*/
int packet_crafter(dns_def *dns, char *ndata, char *idbuffer, int fields, int
direction);
/*

Display Errors
Inputs:
error
Error codes
direction Traffic direction
dns
Pointer to dns_def holding data

*/
void display_errors(int error, int direction, dns_def *dns);
/*

STRing All CoPY
Inputs:
dest
Pointer to destination buffer
src
Pointer to source buffer
len
Number of characters to overwrite
Outputs:
int
Number of characters written

*/
int stracpy(char *dest, const char *src, int len);
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A.3.3 dnstype.c
/****************************************************/
/* NV-DNS
*/
/* Author
: Rex McCracken
*/
/* Date Created : September 24 2004
*/
/* Last Modified
: December 1 2004
*/
/* Description
: Program to remove covert
*/
/*
channels in DNS packets
*/
/****************************************************/
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
/*

<stdio.h>
<stdlib.h>
<time.h>
"defines.h"
"dnstype.h"
<string.h>

STRing All CoPY
Inputs:
dest
Pointer to destination buffer
src
Pointer to source buffer
len
Number of characters to overwrite
Outputs:
int
Number of characters written

*/
int stracpy(char *dest, const char *src, int len) {
int i;
for (i=0; i<len; i++) {
dest[i]=src[i];
}
return i;
}
/*

Validate header
Inputs:
dns
Pointer to dns_def holding the packet data
direction Traffic flow direction
Outputs:
int

Error code
*/
int validate_header(dns_def *dns, int direction) {
int error=0;
if (dns->opcode>2)
error=error|INVALID_OPCODE;
if (dns->z>0)
error=error|INVALID_Z;
if (dns->qdcount==0)
error=error|INVALID_QDCOUNT;
if ((dns->data_len<MAX_UDP_SIZE)&&(dns->tc)==1){
error=error|INVALID_TC;
}
if (direction==OUTBOUND) {
if (dns->qr==1)
error=error|INVALID_QR;
if (dns->aa==1)
error=error|INVALID_AA;
if (dns->rd==1)
error=error|INVALID_RD;
if (dns->ra==1)
error=error|INVALID_RA;
if (dns->rcode>0)
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error=error|INVALID_RCODE;
if (dns->ancount>0)
error=error|INVALID_ANCOUNT;
if (dns->nscount>0)
error=error|INVALID_NSCOUNT;
if (dns->arcount>0)
error=error|INVALID_ARCOUNT;

}

}
if (direction==INBOUND) {
if (dns->qr==0)
error=error|INVALID_QR;
if (dns->rcode>5)
error=error|INVALID_RCODE;
}
return error;

/* DNS Parse
Inputs:
data
character pointer to the packet received
Outputs:
dns_def*

Pointer to allocated memory structure
*/
dns_def* dnsparse(char *data) {
dns_def *dns_packet;
//Load packet header into memory
dns_packet=(dns_def *)malloc(sizeof(dns_def));
dns_packet->pid=data[0];
dns_packet->pid=dns_packet->pid<<8;
dns_packet->pid=dns_packet->pid|data[1];
dns_packet->qr=data[2]&HEADER_QR;
dns_packet->qr=dns_packet->qr>>7;
dns_packet->qr=dns_packet->qr&0x01;
dns_packet->opcode=data[2]&HEADER_OPCODE;
dns_packet->opcode=dns_packet->opcode>>3;
dns_packet->aa=data[2]&HEADER_AA;
dns_packet->aa=dns_packet->aa>>2;
dns_packet->tc=data[2]&HEADER_TC;
dns_packet->tc=dns_packet->tc>>1;
dns_packet->rd=data[2]&HEADER_RD;
dns_packet->ra=data[3]&HEADER_RA;
dns_packet->ra=dns_packet->ra>>7;
dns_packet->ra=dns_packet->ra&0x01;
dns_packet->z=data[3]&HEADER_Z;
dns_packet->z=dns_packet->z>>4;
dns_packet->rcode=data[3]&HEADER_RCODE;
dns_packet->qdcount=data[4];
dns_packet->qdcount=dns_packet->qdcount<<8;
dns_packet->qdcount=dns_packet->qdcount|data[5];
dns_packet->ancount=data[6];
dns_packet->ancount=dns_packet->ancount<<8;
dns_packet->ancount=dns_packet->ancount|data[7];
dns_packet->nscount=data[8];
dns_packet->nscount=dns_packet->nscount<<8;
dns_packet->nscount=dns_packet->nscount|data[9];
dns_packet->arcount=data[10];
dns_packet->arcount=dns_packet->arcount<<8;
dns_packet->arcount=dns_packet->arcount|data[11];
return dns_packet;
}
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/* Process Packet
Inputs:
dns
Pointer to the parsed DNS packet
direction Traffic flow direction

*/

Outputs:
int

Error code

int process_packet(dns_def *dns, int direction) {
char *s;
int current;
int err_code=0, temp=0;
/* Validate the header */
temp=validate_header(dns, direction);
err_code=err_code|temp; //Add the error code
s=dns->data; //Get start of data
current=12;//Jump to end of data
//Check the count size to the packet size
if ((dns->qdcount*6)+(dns->ancount*12)+(dns->nscount*12)+(dns>arcount*12)+current>=dns->data_len){
err_code=err_code|INVALID_QDCOUNT|INVALID_ANCOUNT|INVALID_NSCOUNT|INVALID_AR
COUNT;
}
/* Parse the Question section */
if (direction==OUTBOUND){
if (dns->qdcount>1)
err_code=err_code|INVALID_QDCOUNT;
if (dns->ancount>0)
err_code=err_code|INVALID_ANCOUNT;
if (dns->nscount>0)
err_code=err_code|INVALID_NSCOUNT;
if (dns->arcount>0)
err_code=err_code|INVALID_ARCOUNT;
}
}
/*

return err_code;
Display Errors
Inputs:
error
Error codes
direction Traffic direction
dns
Pointer to dns_def holding data

*/
void display_errors(int error, int direction, dns_def *dns) {
int start=0x00000001;
int val=0, i;
if (error<0) {
if (direction==OUTBOUND)
printf("Client mode errors:\n");
else
printf("Server mode errors:\n");
for (i=0; i<32; i++) {
val=error&start;
val=val|0x80000000;
switch(val) {
case INVALID_QR:
printf(" Query - %d\n", dns->qr);

71

}
}

break;
case INVALID_OPCODE:
printf(" Opcode - %d\n", dns->opcode);
break;
case INVALID_AA:
printf(" AA - %d\n", dns->aa);
break;
case INVALID_TC:
printf(" TC - %d\n", dns->tc);
break;
case INVALID_RD:
printf(" RD - %d\n", dns->rd);
break;
case INVALID_RA:
printf(" RA - %d\n", dns->ra);
break;
case INVALID_Z:
printf(" Z - %d\n", dns->z);
break;
case INVALID_RCODE:
printf(" Rcode - %d\n", dns->rcode);
break;
case INVALID_QDCOUNT:
printf(" QDcount - %d\n", dns->qdcount);
break;
case INVALID_ANCOUNT:
printf(" ANcount - %d\n", dns->ancount);
break;
case INVALID_NSCOUNT:
printf(" NScount - %d\n", dns->nscount);
break;
case INVALID_ARCOUNT:
printf(" Arcount - %d\n", dns->arcount);
break;
default:
;
}
start=start<<1;

}

/* Packet Crafter
Inputs:
dns
Pointer to dns_def struct holding the DNS packet
ndata
Pointer to new packet buffer
idbuffer Pointer to stored ID header
fields
Error code for the fields that need overwritten
direction Direction of the traffic flow

*/

Outputs:
int

Number of characters the ndata buffer is

int packet_crafter(dns_def *dns, char *ndata, char *idbuffer, int fields, int
direction) {
int idnew=0;
int code=0;
stracpy(ndata, dns->data, dns->data_len);
//Handle ID
if (direction==OUTBOUND) {
//Extract & save original request
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//ID field
idnew=dns->pid;
idbuffer[1]=(char)idnew;
idbuffer[0]=(char)(idnew>>8);
idnew=rand()%256;
ndata[0]=idnew&0x0000ff00; //Put new data into packet
ndata[1]=idnew&0x000000ff;
code=fields&0x7fffffff;
if ((code&INVALID_QR)>0){ //Invalid QR type
ndata[2]=ndata[2]&0x7f; //Clear bit
}
if ((code&INVALID_OPCODE)>0){
ndata[2]=ndata[2]&0x87; //Clear 4 bits
}
if ((code&INVALID_AA)>0){
ndata[2]=ndata[2]&0xfb; //Clear 1 bit
}
if ((code&INVALID_TC)>0){
ndata[2]=ndata[2]&0xfd; //Clear bit 2
}
if ((code&INVALID_RD)>0) {
ndata[2]=ndata[2]&0xfe;//For always desired, |0x01;
}
if ((code&INVALID_RA)>0){
ndata[3]=ndata[3]&0x7f;
}
if ((code&INVALID_Z)>0){
ndata[3]=ndata[3]&0x8f;
}
if ((code&INVALID_RCODE)>0){
ndata[3]=ndata[3]&0xf0;
}
if ((code&INVALID_QDCOUNT)>0){
ndata[4]=0;
ndata[5]=1;
}
if ((code&INVALID_ANCOUNT)>0){
ndata[6]=0;
ndata[7]=0;
}
if ((code&INVALID_NSCOUNT)>0){
ndata[8]=0;
ndata[9]=0;
}
if ((code&INVALID_ARCOUNT)>0){
ndata[10]=0;
ndata[11]=0;
}

}
else { //Revert original request
ndata[0]=idbuffer[0];
ndata[1]=idbuffer[1];
}
return dns->data_len;
}
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A.3.4 nvdns.c
/****************************************************/
/* NV-DNS
*/
/* Author
: Rex McCracken
*/
/* Date Created : September 24 2004
*/
/* Last Modified
: December 1 2004
*/
/* Description
: Program to remove covert
*/
/*
channels in DNS packets
*/
/****************************************************/
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

<winsock.h>
<memory.h>
<stdio.h>
<stdlib.h>
<string.h>
<math.h>
<time.h>

//Local includes
#include "defines.h"
#include "dnstype.h"
/*

Write packet
Inputs:
o
File pointer to output data to
data
Char pointer to data to write
size
Size of the data buffer
direction Direction of the data flow
error
Error code from the packet processor
Outputs:
int

Number of characters written from packet
*/
int write_packet(FILE *o, char *data, int size, int direction, int error) {
int i;
if (direction==OUTBOUND)
fprintf(o, "Outbound ");
else
fprintf(o, "Inbound ");
fprintf(o, "%d %d\n", error, size);
for (i=0; i<size; i++) {
fprintf(o, "%c", data[i]);
}
fprintf(o, "\n\n");
return i;
}
void usage(char *name){
printf("Usage: %s server filename\n", name);
printf("\n Server \tIP address of the next level DNS server - x.x.x.x\n");
printf("\n Filename\tName of the file to store received DNS packets to\n");
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
//Network functionality
struct sockaddr_in server_sin, client_sin, dns_server;
int server_size, dns_size, client_size;
SOCKET server_socket, dns_socket;
WSADATA wsa_data;
int status;
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int client_len, len, i, valid;
unsigned int d;
struct timeval timeout;
fd_set sockets, readable;
int fdmax, retry, poll;
int out_bx=0, in_bx=0;
int out_rq=0, in_rq=0;
int error;
char data[MAX_UDP_SIZE], crafted[MAX_UDP_SIZE], idbuf[2];
FILE *f=NULL;
dns_def *dns_data_ptr;
if (argc==1){
usage(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
if ((argc>=2)&& (argc<4)){
if (strcmp(argv[1], "/?")==0){
usage(argv[0]);
exit(0);
}
else {
d=inet_addr(argv[1]);
if (d==INADDR_NONE){
usage(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
f=NULL;
if (argc==3) {
if ((f=fopen(argv[1], "w"))==NULL){
printf("Error creating the file.
exit(11);
}
}
}
}

Check permissions!\n");

//Startup communications
if ((status = WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(1,1),&wsa_data)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"%d is the WSA startup error\n",status);
exit(1);
}
timeout.tv_sec=0;
timeout.tv_usec=500000;
FD_ZERO(&sockets);
FD_ZERO(&readable);
/* Setup the server socket */
server_socket = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (server_socket==INVALID_SOCKET) {
printf("Error, unable to create server socket!\n");
exit(ERROR_SOCKET_UNBOUND);
}
memset((void*)&server_sin, 0, sizeof(server_sin));
server_sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
server_sin.sin_port = htons(DNS_PORT);
server_sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
server_size=sizeof(server_sin);
status=bind(server_socket, (struct sockaddr*)&server_sin, server_size);
if (status==SOCKET_ERROR) {
printf("Error binding the server socket... try another port.\n");
exit(ERROR_BIND_ERROR);
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}
/* Server socket setup */
if((f=fopen("packets.txt", "w"))==NULL) {
printf("error opening file\n");
exit(2);
}
/* Setup the gateway */
dns_socket = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (dns_socket==INVALID_SOCKET) {
printf("Error, unable to bind socket!\n");
exit(ERROR_SOCKET_UNBOUND);
}
memset((void *)&dns_server, 0, sizeof(dns_server));
dns_server.sin_family = AF_INET;
dns_server.sin_port = htons(DNS_PORT);
dns_server.sin_addr.s_addr = d;
if (dns_server.sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_NONE) {
printf("Invalid IP address\n");
exit(3);
}
dns_size=sizeof(dns_server);
/* Gateway setup */
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*

Check for errors (Winsock does this slightly differently) */
Clear the structure so that we don't have garbage around */
AF means Address Family - same as Protocol Family for now */
Fill in port number in address (careful of byte-ordering) */
Fill in IP address (careful of byte-ordering) */
Bind the sockets for communications */

FD_SET(dns_socket, &sockets);
fdmax=dns_socket;
srand(time(NULL));
while (1) {
error=0;
readable=sockets;
for (len=0; len<MAX_UDP_SIZE; len++) { //Clear out the data buffer
data[len]=0;
}
client_len=sizeof(client_sin);
valid=1;
while (valid) {
printf("%d packets out: %d bytes\t%d packet in: %d bytes\n",out_rq,
out_bx, in_rq, in_bx );
if((in_rq>0)&&(out_rq>0)){
printf("Avg out:%d\tAvg In:%d\t", (int)out_bx/out_rq,
(int)in_bx/in_rq);
printf("Ratio:%2.2f/%2.2f\n",
((float)out_bx/(float)(out_bx+in_bx))*(float)100,
((float)in_bx/(float)(out_bx+in_bx))*(float)100);
}
len=recvfrom(server_socket, data, MAX_UDP_SIZE, 0, (struct
sockaddr*)&client_sin, &client_len);
if (len>=0){
break;
}
}
out_rq++; //Update statistics
out_bx+=len;
data[len]=0;
dns_data_ptr=dnsparse(data);
stracpy(dns_data_ptr->data, data, len);
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dns_data_ptr->data_len=len;
//Do my processing steps
error=process_packet(dns_data_ptr, OUTBOUND);
display_errors(error, OUTBOUND, dns_data_ptr);
if ((len>0)&&(f!=NULL))
write_packet(f, data, len, OUTBOUND, error);
packet_crafter(dns_data_ptr, crafted, idbuf, error, OUTBOUND);
idbuf[2]=0;
status=sendto(dns_socket, crafted, len, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&dns_server,
dns_size);
retry=0;
do {
//Timeout handling
poll=select(fdmax+1, &readable, NULL, NULL, &timeout);
for (d=0; d<=(unsigned int)fdmax; d++) {
if ((FD_ISSET(d, &readable))&&(d==dns_socket)) {
len=recvfrom(dns_socket, data, MAX_UDP_SIZE, 0, (struct
sockaddr*)&dns_server, &dns_size);
}
}
switch(poll) {
case 0:
//Handling if the packet is dropped
printf("Timeout... Retransmitting\n");
status=sendto(dns_socket, crafted, len, 0, (struct
sockaddr*)&dns_server, dns_size);
if (status==SOCKET_ERROR) {
closesocket(dns_socket);
dns_socket=socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
status=sendto(dns_socket, crafted, len, 0, (struct
sockaddr*)&dns_server, dns_size);
}
retry++;
break;
case SOCKET_ERROR:
//Handling if the socket dies
printf("Socket error #%d\n", WSAGetLastError());
i=closesocket(dns_socket);
printf("closesocket=%d\n", i);
dns_socket=socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
status=sendto(dns_socket, crafted, len, 0, (struct
sockaddr*)&dns_server, dns_size);
break;
default:
;//printf("%d sockets available\n", poll);
}
} while ((poll==0)&&(retry<3));
free((dns_def *)dns_data_ptr);
data[len]=0;
in_bx+=len;
in_rq++;
dns_data_ptr=dnsparse(data);
stracpy(dns_data_ptr->data, data, len); //Copy all the data over
dns_data_ptr->data_len=len;
client_size=sizeof(client_sin);
error=process_packet(dns_data_ptr, INBOUND);
display_errors(error, INBOUND, dns_data_ptr);
if ((len>0)&&(f!=NULL))
write_packet(f, data, len, INBOUND, error);
packet_crafter(dns_data_ptr, crafted, idbuf, error, INBOUND);
//Send the crafted packet
status=sendto(server_socket, crafted, len, 0, (struct
sockaddr*)&client_sin, client_size);
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free((dns_def *)dns_data_ptr);
printf("\n"); //Give us some spacing for the next time
}
return -1;
}
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Appendix B
Encode/Decode DNS
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B.1

Overview

This appendix provides a listing of the Encode/Decode DNS tool used to test the
effectiveness of the NV-DNS implementation. C was the chosen implementation
language for the tool due to its high level of control and mostly standard implementation
across platforms.

B.2

Usage

B.3

Source Code Listing

To use Encode/Decode DNS, issue the command: eddns mode field filename [IP].
The argument mode tells the program to run in either client (-c) or server (-s) mode. The
argument field determines the DNS field the program will encode and decode the data
from. filename is the name of the file to be read in client mode or written in server mode.
IP is only valid for the client mode and is the IP address of the computer running the
server portion of Encode/Decode DNS with the same field option. Running eddns by
itself will give a list of all valid options.

B.3.1 defines.h
/****************************************************/
/* Encode/Decode DNS
*/
/* Author
: Rex McCracken
*/
/* Date Created : November 21 2004
*/
/* Last Modified
: December 1 2004
*/
/* Description
: Definitions for edDNS
*/
/*
*/
/****************************************************/
/* Operation Mode definitions */
#define SERVER 1
#define CLIENT 0
#define UNDEFINED -1
/* Encoding Mode definitions */
#define ID 1
#define QR 2
#define OPCODE 3
#define AA 4
#define TC 5
#define RD 6
#define RA 7
#define Z 8
#define RCODE 9
#define QDCOUNT 10
#define ANCOUNT 11
#define NSCOUNT 12
#define ARCOUNT 13
#define QNAME 14
#define QTYPE 15
#define QCLASS 16
#define NAME 17
#define TYPE 18
#define CLASS 19
#define TTL 20
#define RDLENGTH 21
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#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define
#define

RR_A 31
RR_NS 32
RR_MD 33
RR_MF 34
RR_CNAME 35
RR_SOA 36
RR_MB 37
RR_MG 38
RR_MR 39
RR_NULL 40
RR_WKS 41
RR_PTR 42
RR_HINFO 43
RR_MINFO 44
RR_MX 45
RR_TXT 46

#define DOMAIN_NAME 0
#define RR_TYPE 2

B.3.2 setup.h
/****************************************************/
/* Encode/Decode DNS
*/
/* Author
: Rex McCracken
*/
/* Date Created : November 21 2004
*/
/* Last Modified
: December 1 2004
*/
/* Description
: Header defining functionality */
/*
text over DNS packets
*/
/****************************************************/
/* Operating Mode
Inputs:
mode
String with the choice of modes
Outputs:
int
Number designating the operating mode

*/
int operating_mode(char *mode);

/* Encoding Mode
Inputs:
mode
String with the choice of encoding fields
Output:
int
Number designating the encoding mode
*/
int encoding_mode(char *mode);
/* Encoding Size
Input:
Field Field used for encoding
Output:
int
Size of the field in bits
*/
int encoding_size(int field);
/*Client mode functions*/
/* File size
Input:
in
File pointer to file needing size check
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Output:
int
Size of the file

*/
int file_size(FILE *in);

/* Bit Encode
Inputs:
Packet Packet to encode the data into
Size
Size of the packet
Field Field # to encode data into
Data
Data to encode into field
Start Current bit needed encoding
Output:
int
Contains the number of bits used in encoding
*/
int bitencode(char packet[], int size, int field, char *data, int start);
/*

Generate Packet
Input:
packet Pointer to char array to contain the packet
field Number designator for the field being encoded
Output
int

Size of the packet generated
*/
int generate_packet(char *packet, int field);
/*Server mode functions*/
/* Bit Decode
Inputs:
packet
Packet as received
size
Packet size
field
Encoding type
response Buffer containing current slice
rsize
Size of the response
used
Number of bits used so far in the response
Outputs:
char

Updated buffer with newest slice
*/
char* bitdecode(char *packet, int size, int field, char *response, int
*bits_found, int used, int *r_size);
/*

Generate Response
Inputs:
packet Pointer to char array containing the packet
Outputs:
int
Size of the packet created

*/
int generate_response(char *packet);
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B.3.3 setup.c
/****************************************************/
/* Encode/Decode DNS
*/
/* Author
: Rex McCracken
*/
/* Date Created : November 21 2004
*/
/* Last Modified
: December 1 2004
*/
/* Description
: Support functions for edDns
*/
/*
*/
/****************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "defines.h"
#include "setup.h"
/* Operating Mode
Inputs:
mode
String with the choice of modes
Outputs:
int
Number designating the operating mode
*/
int operating_mode(char *mode) {
int a=UNDEFINED;
if (strcmp(mode, "-s")==0)
a=SERVER;
if (strcmp(mode, "-c")==0)
a=CLIENT;
return a;
}
/* Encoding Mode
Inputs:
mode
String with the choice of encoding fields
Output:
int
Number designating the encoding mode
*/
int encoding_mode(char *mode) {
int a=UNDEFINED;
if (strcmp(mode, "id")==0)
a=ID;
if (strcmp(mode, "qr")==0)
a=QR;
if (strcmp(mode, "opcode")==0)
a=OPCODE;
if (strcmp(mode, "aa")==0)
a=AA;
if (strcmp(mode, "tc")==0)
a=TC;
if (strcmp(mode, "rd")==0)
a=RD;
if (strcmp(mode, "ra")==0)
a=RA;
if (strcmp(mode, "z")==0)
a=Z;
if (strcmp(mode, "rcode")==0)
a=RCODE;
if (strcmp(mode, "qdcount")==0)
a=QDCOUNT;
if (strcmp(mode, "ancount")==0)
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a=ANCOUNT;
if (strcmp(mode, "nscount")==0)
a=NSCOUNT;
if (strcmp(mode, "arcount")==0)
a=ARCOUNT;
return a;
}
/* Encoding Size
Input:
Field Field used for encoding
Output:
int
Size of the field in bits
*/
int encoding_size(int field) {
int a=UNDEFINED;
switch(field) {
case QR://QR
case AA://AA
case TC://TC
case RD://RD
case RA://TA
a=1;
break;
case Z://Z
a=3;
break;
case OPCODE://OPCODE
case RCODE://RCODE
a=4;
break;
case ID://ID
case QDCOUNT://QDCOUNT
case ANCOUNT://ANCOUNT
case NSCOUNT://NSCOUNT
case ARCOUNT://ARCOUNT
case QTYPE://QTYPE
case QCLASS://QCLASS
case TYPE://TYPE
case CLASS://CLASS
case RDLENGTH://RDLENGTH
a=16;
break;
case TTL://TTL
a=32;
break;
case QNAME://QNAME
case NAME://NAME
a=DOMAIN_NAME;
break;
default://RR_ types
a=RR_TYPE;
break;
}
return a;
}
//Client-specific functions
/*

Generate Packet
Input:
packet Pointer to char array to contain the packet
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field Number designator for the field being encoded
Output
int

Size of the packet generated
*/
int generate_packet(char *packet, int field) {
int a;
char name[13]={ 3, 'w', 'w', 'w', 3, 'w', 'v', 'u', 3, 'e', 'd', 'u', 0 };
char *p;
for (a=0; a<12; a++) {
packet[a]=0; //Clear out the packet header for easy viewing
}
packet[5]=1; //QDcount
p=&packet[12];
//Qname start
strncpy(p, name, 13);
a+=13;
packet[25]=0; //Qtype
packet[26]=1;
packet[27]=0; //Qclass
packet[28]=1;
a=29;
if (field>16) { //We have resource records
;
}
return a;
}
/* File size
Input:
in
File pointer to file needing size check
Output:
int
Size of the file
*/
int file_size(FILE *in) {
int a=0;
char c;
while (!feof(in)) {
fscanf(in, "%c", &c);
a++;
}
a--;
rewind(in); //Move pointer back to file start
return a;
}
/*

Bit Slice
Inputs:
Data
Data to be encoded
bit_req
Bits requested for slice
cur_bit
Offset from data start to be encoded
Outputs:
int
slice

Number of bits encoded
Low-bit packed character

*/
int bitslice(char *data, int bit_req, int cur_bit, int *slice) {
int byte=0, len=0;
int bit=0, a=0;
char *b_slice=0, temp=0;
int val=0;
len=strlen(data);
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}

bit=cur_bit%8;
byte=(cur_bit-bit)/8;
for (a=0; a<bit_req; a++) {
/* Pack into temp */
if (bit==0){
temp=data[byte]&0x80;
temp=temp>>7;
}
if (bit==1) {
temp=data[byte]&0x40;
temp=temp>>6;
}
if (bit==2){
temp=data[byte]&0x20;
temp=temp>>5;
}
if (bit==3){
temp=data[byte]&0x10;
temp=temp>>4;
}
if (bit==4){
temp=data[byte]&0x08;
temp=temp>>3;
}
if (bit==5){
temp=data[byte]&0x04;
temp=temp>>2;
}
if (bit==6){
temp=data[byte]&0x02;
temp=temp>>1;
}
if (bit==7){
temp=data[byte]&0x01;
}
/*Place into slice*/
val=val<<1;
val=val|temp;
bit++;
if (bit==8){
bit=0;
byte++;
}
if (byte>len){
a++;
break;
}
}
*slice=val;
return a;

/* Bit Encode
Inputs:
Packet Packet to encode the data into
Size
Size of the packet
Field Field # to encode data into
Data
Data to encode into field
Start Current bit needed encoding
Output:
int
Contains the number of bits used in encoding
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*/
int bitencode(char *packet, int size, int field, char *data, int start) {
int enc_size=UNDEFINED, esize=0;
int bits_returned=0;
int slice=0;
int bitcount=start;
int max_bitlen=0, bitlen=0;
max_bitlen=strlen(data)*8;
enc_size=encoding_size(field);
if (enc_size>7) {
esize=8;
}
else
esize=enc_size;
while ((bitcount-start)<enc_size) {
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize, bitcount, &slice);
bitcount+=bits_returned;
switch(field){
case ID:
packet[0]=(char)slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize, bitcount, &slice);
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[1]=(char)slice;
break;
case QR://QR
slice=slice<<7;
packet[2]=packet[2]|slice;
break;
case OPCODE://OPCODE
slice=slice<<3;
packet[2]=packet[2]|slice;
break;
case AA://AA
slice=slice<<2;
packet[2]=packet[2]|slice;
break;
case TC://TC
slice=slice<<1;
packet[2]=packet[2]|slice;
break;
case RD://RD
packet[2]=packet[2]|slice;
break;
case RA://RA
slice=slice<<7;
packet[3]=packet[3]|slice;
break;
case Z://Z
slice=slice<<4;
packet[3]=packet[3]|slice;
break;
case RCODE://RCODE
packet[3]=packet[3]|slice;
break;
case QDCOUNT://QDCOUNT
packet[4]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize, bitcount, &slice);
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[5]=slice;
break;
case ANCOUNT://ANCOUNT
packet[6]=slice;
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bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[7]=slice;
break;
case NSCOUNT://NSCOUNT
packet[8]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[9]=slice;
break;
case ARCOUNT://ARCOUNT
packet[10]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[11]=slice;
break;
case QTYPE://QTYPE
packet[25]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[26]=slice;
break;
case QCLASS://QCLASS
packet[27]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[28]=slice;
break;
case TYPE://TYPE
packet[42]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[43]=slice;
break;
case CLASS://CLASS
packet[44]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[45]=slice;
break;
case TTL://TTL
packet[46]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[47]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[48]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[49]=slice;
break;
case RDLENGTH://RDLENGTH
packet[50]=slice;
bits_returned=bitslice(data, esize,
bitcount+=bits_returned;
packet[51]=slice;
break;
default:
printf("Shouldn't be here\n");
bitcount=bitlen;
break;
}

bitcount, &slice);

bitcount, &slice);

bitcount, &slice);

bitcount, &slice);

bitcount, &slice);

bitcount, &slice);

bitcount, &slice);

bitcount, &slice);
bitcount, &slice);
bitcount, &slice);

bitcount, &slice);
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}
return bitcount;
}
//
/*

Server specific functions
Generate Response
Inputs:
packet Pointer to char array containing the packet
Outputs:
int
Size of the packet created

*/
int generate_response(char *packet) {
int a;
char *p, name[13]={3, 'w', 'w', 'w', 3, 'w', 'v', 'u', 3, 'e', 'd', 'u', 0};

}

packet[2]=(char)0x84;
for (a=3; a<12; a++) {
packet[a]=0;
}
packet[5]=1;
packet[7]=1;
p=&packet[26];
strncpy(p, name, 13);
a=26+13;
packet[39]=0;
packet[40]=1;
packet[41]=0;
packet[42]=1;
a=43;
return a;

/* Bit Offset
Inputs:
Field # of the encoding field
Outputs:
int
Bits from the start of the packet
*/
int bitoffset(int field) {
int a;
switch(field){
case ID:
a=0;
break;
case QR:
a=16;
break;
case OPCODE://OPCODE
a=17;
break;
case AA://AA
a=21;
break;
case TC://TC
a=22;
break;
case RD://RD
a=23;
break;
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case RA://RA
a=24;
break;
case Z://Z
a=25;
break;
case RCODE://RCODE
a=28;
break;
case QDCOUNT://QDCOUNT
a=32;
break;
case ANCOUNT://ANCOUNT
a=48;
break;
case NSCOUNT://NSCOUNT
a=64;
break;
case ARCOUNT://ARCOUNT
a=80;
break;
case QTYPE://QTYPE
a=25*8;
break;
case QCLASS://QCLASS
a=27*8;
break;
case TYPE://TYPE
a=42*8;
break;
case CLASS://CLASS
a=44*8;
break;
case TTL://TTL
a=46*8;
break;
case RDLENGTH:
a=50*8;
break;
default:
printf("Error!\n");
a=-1;
break;
}
return a;
}
/*

Create Mask
Inputs:
Field Number designator of the encoding field
Outputs:
char
Character containing a bitmask for that field

*/
char create_mask(int field) {
char a;
switch (field){
case ID:
case QDCOUNT:
case ANCOUNT:
case NSCOUNT:
case ARCOUNT:
case QTYPE:
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case QCLASS:
case TYPE:
case CLASS:
case TTL:
case RDLENGTH:
a=(char)0xff;
break;
case QR:
case RA:
a=(char)0x80;
break;
case OPCODE:
a=0x78;
break;
case AA:
a=0x04;
break;
case TC:
a=0x02;
break;
case RD:
a=0x01;
break;
case Z:
a=0x70;
break;
case RCODE:
a=0x0f;
break;
}
return a;
}
/*

BitExtraction
Inputs:
Packet
Packet with data encoded
Prev_offset
Offset in bits from the last returned octet
Field
Field # containing the encoded data
Outputs:
char

Low order packed byte containing the extracted data
*/
char bitextract(char *packet, int prev_offset, int field){
int bit=0, byte=0, a=0;
char extract=0;
int esize=-1;
char mask;
int offset;
offset=bitoffset(field);
mask=create_mask(field);//Returns a mask for the field we're working with
bit=(offset+prev_offset)%8;
byte=(offset+prev_offset-bit)/8;
extract=packet[byte]&mask;
switch(field){
//Extract Data
case QR:
case RA:
extract=extract>>7; //Slide data to low-order
extract=extract&0x01;
//Clear extra data
break;
case OPCODE:
extract=extract>>3;
//Slide data to low-order
extract=extract&0x0f;
//Clear extra data
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}

break;
case AA:
extract=extract>>2; //Slide data to low-order
extract=extract&0x01;
//Clear extra data
break;
case TC:
extract=extract>>1; //Slide data to low-order
extract=extract&0x01;
//Clear extra data
break;
case Z:
extract=extract>>4; //Slide data to low-order
extract=extract&0x07;
//Clear extra data
break;
default:
;
}
return extract;

/* Bit Decode
Inputs:
packet
Packet as received
size
Packet size
field
Encoding type
response Buffer containing current slice
rsize
Size of the response
used
Number of bits used so far in the response

*/

Outputs:
char

Updated buffer with newest slice

char* bitdecode(char *packet, int size, int field, char response[], int
*bits_found, int used, int *rsize) {
int enc_size=0, r_size=0, e_size=0;
char slice;
char *alldata=NULL, p=0;
int bit=0, byte=0, bitcount=0;
//Response size
if (response==NULL) { //If we don't have a response size, allocate one
switch (field){
case ID://ID
case QDCOUNT://QDcount
case ANCOUNT://ANcount
case NSCOUNT://NScount
case ARCOUNT://ARcount
case QTYPE://Qtype
case QCLASS://Qclass
case TYPE://Type
case CLASS://Class
case RDLENGTH://Rdlength
case Z://Z - Z overflow
r_size=2;
break;
case TTL://TTL
r_size=4;
break;
default://QR, OPCODE, AA, TC, RD, RA, RCODE
r_size=1;
break;
}
alldata=(char*)calloc(sizeof(char), r_size);
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}
else {
alldata=response;
r_size=*rsize;
}
enc_size=encoding_size(field);
if (enc_size>7)
e_size=8; //Max number of bits to get per loop
else
e_size=enc_size;
//Bits to get per loop
while (bitcount<enc_size) {
//Loop to get large fields & small fields
slice=bitextract(packet, bitcount, field);//Get the appropriate bits
bitcount+=e_size;
//Add the encoding size to the bits
if (field==Z) {
//Check for overflow - Applies to Z field ONLY
bitcount+=used;
if (alldata==NULL){
printf("ERROR!!!!!!!!!!!!\n\n");
exit(1);
}
if ((bitcount-8)>0){
//Handle 9 & 10 bits
if ((bitcount-8)==1) { //Handle 2 bits over
alldata[0]=alldata[0]<<2;
alldata[0]=alldata[0]|((slice&0x06)>>1);
//Mask slice and
align
alldata[1]=slice&0x01;; //Mask for final bit
}
if ((bitcount-8)==2) {
//Handle 1 bit over
alldata[0]=alldata[0]<<1;
//Move data over
alldata[0]=alldata[0]|((slice&0x04)>>2); //Mask slice and
align
alldata[1]=slice&0x03;; //Mask for 2 bits
}
}
else { //Handle 0-8 bits
alldata[0]=alldata[0]<<e_size;
//Move data over
alldata[0]=alldata[0]|slice;
//Add data
}
}
if ((e_size<8)&&(field!=Z)){
//Handle small fields
alldata[0]=alldata[0]<<e_size;
alldata[0]=alldata[0]|slice;
}
if (e_size==8) {
alldata[byte]=slice;
byte++;
}
}
response=alldata;
//Set / return our response
*bits_found=enc_size; //Return the encoding size
*rsize=r_size;
//Return the buffer size
return response;
//Return the response
}
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B.3.4 main.c
/****************************************************/
/* Encode/Decode DNS
*/
/* Author
: Rex McCracken
*/
/* Date Created : November 21 2004
*/
/* Last Modified
: December 1 2004
*/
/* Description
: Program to encode and decode
*/
/*
text over DNS packets
*/
/****************************************************/
//Standard Includes
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <winsock.h>
//Local Includes
#include "defines.h"
#include "setup.h"
/* Usage
Input:
name

Name of this program

Output:
None
*/
void disp_header(char *packet) {
printf("ID: %c%c\n",packet[0], packet[1]);
printf("QR: %d\n", (packet[2]&0x80)>>7);
printf("Op: %d\n", (packet[2]&0x78)>>3);
printf("AA: %d\n", (packet[2]&0x04)>>2);
printf("TC: %d\n", (packet[2]&0x02)>>1);
printf("RD: %d\n", (packet[2]&0x01));
printf("RA: %d\n", (packet[3]&0x80)>>7);
printf("Z : %d\n", (packet[3]&0x70)>>4);
printf("Rc: %d\n", (packet[3]&0x0f));
printf("QD: %c%c\n", packet[4], packet[5]);
printf("AN: %c%c\n", packet[6], packet[7]);
printf("NS: %c%c\n", packet[8], packet[9]);
printf("AR: %c%c\n", packet[10], packet[11]);
}
void usage(char *name) {
printf("Usage instructions for %s\n\n", name);
printf("%s (OP_MODE) (ENCODE_MODE) (FILENAME) [IP] \n\n", name);
printf("Where:\n");
printf("OP_MODE\n\t -s \tServer mode\n");
printf("\t -c \tClient mode\n\n");
printf("ENCODE_MODE\n");
printf("\t id\n");
printf("\t opcode\n");
printf("\t aa\n");
printf("\t tc\n");
printf("\t rd\n");
printf("\t ra\n");
printf("\t z\n");
printf("\t rcode\n");
printf("\t qdcount\n");
printf("\t ancount\n");
printf("\t nscount\n");
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}

printf("\t arcount\n");
printf("\n");
printf("FILENAME\n");
printf("\tName of the file to be read (client) or written (server)\n\n");
printf("IP\n");
printf("\tIP address NV-DNS is running on\n");
printf("\n");

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
//Network-related Variables
struct sockaddr_in comm_sin, client_sin, server_sin;
int comm_size, client_size, server_size;
int client_len, packet_cnt=0;
SOCKET sock;
WSADATA wsa_data;
int status, len, valid=1, started=0, resp_size=0;
char msg[512];
fd_set sockets, readable;
struct timeval time;
int fdmax, poll, retry;
//Local variables
FILE *f=NULL;
char name[20], *p=NULL, *s=NULL;
char ip[35];
char *data=NULL;
int op_mode=UNDEFINED, choice=UNDEFINED, enc_mode=UNDEFINED;
int enc_size=UNDEFINED, i=0;
int d_size=-1, bitcnt=0, bits_returned=0;
char c;
for (i=0; i<=512; i++) {
msg[i]=0;
}
if ((argc<4)||(argc>5)) {
p=argv[0];
usage(p);
exit(1);
}
/* Initialize communications */
if ((status = WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(1,1),&wsa_data)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"%d is the WSA startup error\n",status);
exit(1);
}
/* Parse command line */
s=argv[0];
p=argv[1];
op_mode=operating_mode(p);
if (op_mode==UNDEFINED){
usage(s);
exit(1);
}
if ((op_mode==CLIENT)&&(argc==4)){
usage(s);
exit(1);
}
p=argv[2];
//Encoding mode
enc_mode=encoding_mode(p);
if (enc_mode==UNDEFINED) {
usage(s);
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exit(1);
}
enc_size=encoding_size(enc_mode);
//Determine the encoding scheme size
strcpy(name, argv[3]);//Filename determination
if (argc==5) {//Client Destination IP
if (op_mode==CLIENT) {
strcpy(ip, argv[4]);
}
else {
usage(s);
exit(1);
}
}
if (op_mode==SERVER) {//File handling
if ((f=fopen(name, "w"))==NULL) {
printf("Error opening file for writing!\n");
usage(s);
exit(2);
}
}
else { //Client functions
if ((f=fopen(name, "r"))==NULL) {
printf("File not found!\n");
usage(s);
exit(2);
}
}
//Polling timeout selection
if (op_mode==CLIENT) {
time.tv_sec=(long)1;
time.tv_usec=(long)0;
}
else {
time.tv_sec=(long)5;
time.tv_usec=(long)0;
}
/* Client specific code */
if (op_mode==CLIENT) {
//Set socket /network options
sock=socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sock==INVALID_SOCKET) {
printf("Error! Unable to create a socket!\n");
exit(10);
}
memset((void*)&comm_sin, 0, sizeof(comm_sin));
comm_sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
comm_sin.sin_port = htons(53);
comm_sin.sin_addr.s_addr= inet_addr(ip);
comm_size=sizeof(comm_sin);
FD_ZERO(&sockets);
FD_ZERO(&readable);
FD_SET(sock, &sockets);
fdmax=sock;
printf("Client mode\t");
printf("Port:%d\tDest:%s:%d\n", sock, inet_ntoa(comm_sin.sin_addr),
htons(comm_sin.sin_port));
d_size=file_size(f);
//Load the file into memory
if (d_size>0) {
data=(char*)calloc(sizeof(char), d_size);
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for (i=0; i<d_size; i++) {
fscanf(f, "%c", &c);
data[i]=c;
}
data[d_size]=0;
for (i=0; i<d_size; i++) {
printf("%c", data[i]);
}
printf("\n");
printf("Sending this data will require %d packets\n",
d_size*8/enc_size);
bitcnt=0;
while (bitcnt<d_size*8) {
//Generate packet
len=generate_packet(msg, enc_mode);
//Insert data
i=bitencode(msg, len, enc_mode, data, bitcnt);
bitcnt+=(i-bitcnt);
retry=0;
sendto(sock, msg, len, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&comm_sin, comm_size);
do {
readable=sockets;
poll=select(fdmax+1, &readable, NULL, NULL, &time);
switch (poll) {
case 0:
printf("Packet timeout, resending.\n");
sendto(sock, msg, len, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&comm_sin,
comm_size);
retry++;
break;
case SOCKET_ERROR:
printf("Socket Error!\n");
bitcnt=d_size*8;
break;
default:
;
}
} while ((poll==0)&&(retry<3));
//If we time out too many times
if (retry>=3) {
printf("Server connection unavailable\n");
bitcnt=d_size*8;
break;
}
len=recvfrom(sock, msg, 512, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&comm_sin,
&comm_size);
msg[len]=0;
printf("%s packet %d Received a response\n", argv[2], packet_cnt);
packet_cnt++;
}
}
else {
printf("Empty file %s!\n", name);
exit(3);
}
}
/* Server specific code */
else {
//Set socket / network options
sock=socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sock==INVALID_SOCKET) {
printf("Error! Unable to create a socket!\n");
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exit(10);
}
memset((void*)&client_sin, 0, sizeof(client_sin));
memset((void*)&server_sin, 0, sizeof(server_sin));
server_sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
server_sin.sin_port = htons(53);
server_sin.sin_addr.s_addr=htonl(INADDR_ANY);
server_size=sizeof(server_sin);
status=bind(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&server_sin, server_size);
if (status==SOCKET_ERROR) {
printf("Error binding socket!\n");
exit(12);
}
listen(sock, 10);
FD_ZERO(&sockets);
FD_ZERO(&readable);
FD_SET(sock, &sockets);
fdmax=sock;
printf("Server mode: %s:%d\n", inet_ntoa(server_sin.sin_addr),
htons(server_sin.sin_port));
bitcnt=0;
client_size=16;
client_len=0;
while (valid) {
if(started) {
readable=sockets;
poll=select(fdmax+1, &readable, NULL, NULL, &time);
switch(poll){
case 0:
printf("Data feed ended.\n");
valid=0;
break;
default:
;
}
}
if (valid==0)
break;
len=recvfrom(sock, msg, 500, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&client_sin,
&client_size);
msg[len]=0;
started=1;
if (len==SOCKET_ERROR) {
printf("The last error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError());
exit(1);
}
//Recv packet until timeout
data=bitdecode(msg, len, enc_mode, data, &bits_returned, bitcnt,
&resp_size);
data[resp_size]=0;
bitcnt+=bits_returned;
if (bitcnt>7) { //If we have a full packet
bits_returned=bitcnt%8;
if ((bits_returned>0)||(enc_mode==Z))//If we don't have a full
byte - Z field
bitcnt=resp_size-1;
//Limit by one
else
bitcnt=resp_size;
for (i=0; i<bitcnt; i++) {
fprintf(f, "%c", data[i]);
//Write this to file
}
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if (bits_returned>0) {
data[0]=data[bitcnt];
start

//Move the data from unfully used to

i=1;
}
else
i=0;
for (i; i<resp_size; i++) {
data[i]=0;
//Clear out the rest of the field
}
bitcnt=bits_returned;
//Reset the used bits field
printf("\n");

}
len=generate_response(msg);
len=sendto(sock, msg, len, 0, (struct sockaddr*)&client_sin,
client_size);
packet_cnt++;
printf("%s packet %d\n", argv[2], packet_cnt);
//Sleep(250);
}
i=0;
while(data[i]>0) {
fprintf(f, "%c", data[i]);
i++;
}
}
fclose(f);
if (op_mode==SERVER) {
printf("Retrieved data: ");
f=fopen(name, "r");
while(!feof(f)){
fscanf(f, "%c", &c);
if (c>0)
printf("%c", c);
c=0;
}
printf("\n");
fclose(f);
}
return 0;
}
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Appendix C
Results from NV-DNS and Encode/Decode DNS
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The file used in the encoding process was a simple text file with the text “i’m just
a long text file that i’m transmitting across myself.” The results of the transmission
between the client and server aspects of Encode/Decode DNS alone and with NV-DNS
are included in the following subsections.

C.1 ID field
C.1.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.1.1 NV-DNS
C ¸ ö
N ¯ 1⁄2 î € Í ‹ R )

O & ’ ç Ç } Œ 9 W | 1⁄4 _ ÿ w 7 ð ‹

C.2 QR field
C.2.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.2.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

C.3 OPCODE field
C.3.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.3.2 NV-DNS
□ □ □□□□ □ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □ □ □□□□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□ □

C.4 AA field
C.4.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.4.2 NV-DNS
□□ □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

C.5 TC field
C.5.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.5.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
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C.6 RD field
C.6.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.6.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

C.7 RA field
C.7.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.7.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

C.8 Z field
C.8.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.8.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

C.9 RCODE field
C.9.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.9.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

C.10 QDCOUNT field
C.10.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.10.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
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C.11 ANCOUNT field
C.11.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.11.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

C.12 NSCOUNT field
C.12.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.12.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

C.13 ARCOUNT field
C.13.1 No NV-DNS
i'm just a long text file that i'm transmitting across myself.

C.13.2 NV-DNS
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
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